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It is important to understand how legal fact finders determine causa-
tion and assign blame. However, this process is poorly understood. Among
the psychological factors that affect decision makers are an omission bias (a
tendency to blame actions more than inactions [omissions] for bad results),
and a normality bias (a tendency to react more strongly to bad outcomes that
spring from abnormal rather than normal circumstances). The omission
and normality biases often reinforce one another when inaction preserves the
normal state and when action creates an abnormal state. But what happens
when these biases push in opposite directions as they would when inaction
promotes an abnormal state or when action promotes a normal state? Which
bias exerts the stronger influence on the judgments and behaviors of legal
decision makers? The authors address this issue in two controlled experi-
ments. One experiment involves medical malpractice and the other involves
stockbroker negligence. They find that jurors pay much more attention to the
normality of conditions than to whether those conditions arose through acts
or omissions. Defendants who followed a nontraditional medical treatment
regime or who chose a nontraditional stock portfolio received more blame and
more punishment for bad outcomes than did defendants who obtained
equally poor results after recommending a traditional medical regime or a
traditional stock portfolio. Whether these recommendations entailed an ac-
tion or an omission was essentially irrelevant. The Article concludes with a
discussion of the implications of a robust normality bias for American
jurisprudence.
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INTRODUCTION
At the height of their conceit, law-and-economics scholars pur-
ported to explain why people act as they do (rational pursuit of self-
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interest)1 and why the common law is as it is (efficiency). 2 Law-and-
economics scholars- are now in at least partial retreat," as a veritable
mountain of scientific evidence now exists showing that decision mak-
ers violate economic dicta across numerous contexts, 4 and that judges
I RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (2d ed. 1977) (noting that eco-
nomics assumes that "man is a rational maximizer of his ends in life, his satisfactions-what
we shall call his 'self-interest'"); see also Roger G. Noll &James E. Krier, Some Implications of
Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19J. LEGAL STUD. 747, 750-51 (1990) (summarizing
key assumptions of the standard model of decision making); W. Kip Viscusi, Individual
Rationality, Hazard Warnings, and the Foundations of Tort Law, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 625, 636
(1996) (observing that the "foundation of economic analysis of choice is based on the
rationality of individual decision making").
2 See AI1LLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT
LAw 1 (1987) (arguing that "the common law of torts is best explained as if the judges...
were trying to promote efficient resource allocation"); see also W. Bradley Wendel, Mixed
Signals: Rational-Choice Theories of Social Norms and the Pragmatics of Explanation, 77 IND. L.J. 1,
4 (2002) (noting that law-and-economics "adherents claimed it explains everything, from
nuisance remedies (which it probably does) to sexual idiosyncracies [sic], to racial discrim-
ination, to holiday customs, to the whole universe of social norms").
I Even Judge Richard Posner, virtual founder of the law-and-economics movement,
has largely abandoned any strict application of.the premise that man is a rational eco-
nomic actor. SeeJeanne L. Schroeder, Rationality in Law and Economics Scholarship, 79 OR.
L. REv. 147, 147 (2000). Professor Schroeder notes:
Over the years, however, Posner's conception of rationality has devolved
from end-means reasoning by a conscious individual human actor, to un-
conscious instinct which is nevertheless beneficial to an individual subject
(animal or human), to the mechanistic reproductive activity of individual
genes which may or may not be beneficial to either the organism of which
the gene is a part-or even to the gene itself. Indeed, all that seems.to be
left of the "rational" component of Posnerian rationality might be the posi-
tive normative connotations of the term itself.
Id.; see also Jeanne L. Schroeder, Just So Stories: Posnerian Methodology, 22 CARDOZO L. REV.
351, 421 (2001) (contending that Judge Posner "no longer uses, if in fact he ever did,
[Milton] Friedman's assumption of economic rationality").
4 SeeJohn Conlisk, Why Bounded Rationality ? 34J. ECON. LITERATURE 669, 670 (1996).
(noting that there exists a "mountain of experiments" in which people act inconsistently
with the rational-actor model by making intransitive choices, emphasizing vivid over pallid
events, displaying overconfidence, and so on); Larry T. Garvin, Adequate Assurance of Per-
formance: Of Risk, Duress, and Cognition, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 71, 145 (1998) ("Cognitive
psychology and experimental economics have found a smorgasbord of cognitive errors,
which collectively falsify most of the axioms of rational choice theory."); Joseph Henrich et
al., In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies, 73 AM.
ECON. REV. (Papers and Proceedings), May 2001, at 77 (finding in a study of fifteen small
societies around the world that "the canonical model of the self-interested material payoff-
maximizing actor is systematically violated"); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and
Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23, 44 (2000) (observing that "a large
body of social science literature demonstrates that [rational choice theory's] predictions
are not always accurate, and that deviations from so-called 'rational' behavior are often
systematic"); Paul J.H. Schoemaker, The Expected Utility Model: Its Variants, Purposes, Evidence,
and Limitations, 20J. ECON. LITERATURE 529, 530 (1982) ("[M]ost of the empirical evidence
is difficult to reconcile with the principle of [expected utility] maximization.").
Several collections of the leading examples of these studies are available. See, e.g.,
ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (Richard D. Thaler ed., 1993); BOUNDED RATIONALITY:
THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX (G. Gigerenzer & R. Selten eds., 2001); CHOICES, VALUES, AND
FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000);JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING:
AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER (Terry Connolly et al. eds., 2d ed. 2000); JUDGMENT UNDER
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and jurors ignore efficiency criteria when making decisions that estab-
lish the common law.5
This Article contributes to the growing literature on behavioral
influences in the law6 by offering a psychological account of legal de-
cision making. Rather than presume that a uniform and rational set
of economic criteria accounts for legal outcomes, we draw on the in-
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); RESEARCH ON
JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING: CURRENTS, CONNECTIONS, AND CONTROVERSIES (William
M. Goldstein & Robin M. Hogarth eds., 1997).
5 Jonathan Baron and Ilana Ritov conducted an empirical study in which they found,
consistent with most studies of jury decision making, that jurors rarely think like econo-
mists. Specifically, they discovered that most potential jurors and judges paid little or no
attention to the deterrent rationale of tort law upon which Landes and Posner rested their
analysis. Jonathan Baron & Ilana Ritov, Intuitions About Penalties and Compensation in the
Context of Tort Law, 7J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 17, 31-32 (1993). They concluded that:
Our results create a puzzle for positive economic theories of law, particu-
larly that of Landes and Posner .... If the system can be understood in
terms of the consequentialist rationale, as they claim it can, what human
judgments maintain it? Note that our main findings held even for judges,
and most of our other subjects are potential jury members. Perhaps the
present system is not so close to be [ing] the "best of all possible consequen-
tialist worlds," as Landes and Posner would suggest.
Id. at 32; see alsoJonathan Baron, Heuristics and Biases in Equity Judgments: A Utilitarian Ap-
proach, in PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE 109, 111 (Barbara A. Mellers &Jonathan
Baron eds., 1993) ("Utilitarianism often conflicts with our intuitive beliefs about what is
morally right."); Kevin M. Carlsmith et al., Why Do We Punish? Deterrence and Just Deserts as
Motives for Punishment, 83J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 284, 295 (2002) (finding, incon-
sistent with economic reasoning, that "[a]lthough participants expressed support for deter-
rance as a goal of punishment ..... [t]heir punishment assignments were instead
consistent with a theory of punishment based on the moral deservingness of the perpetra-
tor");John M. Darley et al., Incapacitation and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 24 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 659, 676 (2000) (finding, inconsistent with traditional economic theory, that
a person's desire to punish is based primarily upon a just deserts motive); Heidi Li Feld-
man, Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue Ethics and Tort Law, 74 CHI-KENT L. REV.
1431, 1434 (2000) (noting that "[l]ayjurors possess no particular expertise in economic
analysis [and that c]ivil negligence actions do not ask jurors to apply a standard of care
that even refers to these matters"); David A. Hoffman & Michael P. O'Shea, Can Law and
Economics Be Both Practical and Principled?, 53 ALA. L. REV. 335, 374, 395-98 (2002) (noting
that "there is evidence that Americans prefer not to have economic and utilitarian meth-
ods of decision-making play a large role in their legal system"); Jonathan J. Koehler &
Andrew D. Gershoff, Betrayal Aversion: When Agents of Protection Become Agents of Harm, ORGA-
NIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES (forthcoming 2003) (manuscript at 13-18,
on file with authors) (finding, inconsistent with economic reasoning, that mock jurors did
not assign greater punishment to a thief whose crime was harder to detect); Cass R. Sun-
stein et al., Do People Want Optimal Deterrence?, 29J. LEGAL STUD. 237, 248 (2000) (finding
that an economic approach to deterrence in the legal system is broadly rejected by the
public); W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 547, 566
(2000) (finding that economic analysis "is inherently unpleasant and may offend jurors").
6 Sunstein's book is an accessible introduction to the field of behavioral law and
economics (BLE). BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000). Because
BLE replaces law and economics' unrealistic assumptions with evidence as to how people
actually think and make decisions, Professor Farber suggests that it might be called the
"Law and Reality" movement or the "Realistic Legal Studies" movement. Daniel A. Farber,
Toward a New Legal Realism, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 279, 303 (2001).
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creasingly persuasive cognitive literature to understand how legal de-
cision makers assess causality and subsequently assign responsibility
and blame. Despite the centrality of these activities in our legal sys-
tem, the underlying cognitive forces are only now receiving serious
consideration by legal scholars.
7
For example, consider two stockbrokers, each of whom has dis-
cretionary control over a client's investment portfolio. Suppose that
stockbroker #1 moves his client's holdings from ABC Co. stock to XYZ
Co. stock. Suppose further that stockbroker #2 considers switching
his client's holdings from XYZ stock to ABC stock but decides not to
make the move. Finally, suppose that ABC Co. then substantially in-
creases in value while XYZ Co. substantially decreases in value. The
clients of both stockbrokers suffer identical economic harm. Both lost
money because their stockbrokers opted for stock in XYZ Co. over
stock in ABC Co. But will the clients of the two stockbrokers fare
equally well at trial? Behavioral research suggests that jurors see a
stronger causal connection between the bad outcome and the deci-
sion to act made by stockbroker #1 than between the bad outcome
and the decision not to act made by stockbroker #2.8 Jurors are also
likely to assign more blame to stockbroker #1 and award higher dam-
ages to clients of stockbroker #1, despite the fact that the clients of
both stockbrokers suffered identical financial injury.9 This is an ex-
ample of a behavioral bias called the omission bias-the tendency of
people to find more blameworthy bad results that stem from actions
than bad results that stem from otherwise equivalent omissions.' 0
Next, consider a scenario in which Mr. X is mugged while taking
his usual route home from work, and Mr. Y (in a separate incident) is
mugged in an identical fashion and with identical consequences while
taking an unusual route home from work.1 Which mugger will re-
ceive the more severe punishment? Once again, economic theory
does not readily distinguish between the two cases, but psychological
research suggests that the mugger of Mr. Y will spend more time in
jail. People generally perceive closer links between bad outcomes and
abnormal states than between bad outcomes and normal states. Be-
cause Mr. Y was mugged while taking an unusual route home, this
7 See Richard L. Wiener et al., Counteifactual Thinking in Mock Juror Assessments of Negli-
gence: A Preliminary Investigation, 12 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 89, 89 (1994) (noting that "the cogni-
tive processes by which people evaluate negligence claims are not well understood").
8 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Psychology of Preferences, Sci. AM., Jan. 1982,
at 160, 173 (discussing a study of a similar example).
9 See id.
10 See infra Part I.A.
II This hypothetical is also based on an influential study. C. Neil Macrae et al.,
Counterfactual Thinking and the Perception of Criminal Behaviour, 84 BRIT. J. PSYClIOL. 221,
224-25 (1993).
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crime will be judged more severely than the mugging of Mr. X, which
took place in the context of the usual route.' 2 This is an example of
what we refer to as the normality bias-the tendency for people to react
more strongly to bad outcomes that spring from abnormal circum-
stances than to otherwise identical outcomes that spring from more
ordinary circumstances.' 3
Traditional economic analyses do not predict or account for such
decisional biases. Yet, the phenomena have support in the empirical
psychological literature, and they have implications for the rule of
law. 14 For example, the omission bias may partially account for,
among other things, why American common law imposes no duty to
rescue.1 5 Moreover, the normality bias may help explain the common
law's approach to proximate causation.' 6
In Part I, we discuss the omission bias and introduce the normal-
ity bias. In addition, we demonstrate how these biases parallel the
law's inherent conservatism and create incentives for legal actors to
portray conduct in terms of its degree of activeness and abnormality.
In Part II, we examine critically the characteristics of and psycho-
logical bases for the omission and normality biases. We discuss related
behavioral heuristics and biases (e.g., the status quo bias, endowment
effects, loss aversion, and sunk costs), and consider how the human
tendency to think in counterfactual terms and to suffer feelings of
regret explains the emergence of omission and normality biases. We
also show that the omission and normality biases are often mutually
reinforcing, because inaction (omission) typically preserves the norm
and action typically upsets that norm.
In Part III, we disentangle the omission and normality biases in
two controlled experiments involving hundreds of mock jurors. In
order to determine whether the omission bias or the normality bias
exerts a greater influence on legal judgment, we ask: What happens
when decision makers' preference for inaction undermines rather
than reinforces accepted norms? How will decision makers respond
when action creates a normal state and inaction leads to an abnormal
state? Our experiments-one involving medical malpractice and the
other involving stockbroker negligence-suggest that the normality
bias is controlling. Jurors mete out their strongest punishments in
cases in which an abnormal state arises, regardless of whether this
state was brought about by actions or omissions.
12 See infra Part II.G.2.
13 See infra Part I.B.
14 See infra Part I.
15 See infra Parts IA, I.G.
16 See infra Part I.B.
[Vol. 88:583
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Finally, in Part IV, we provide several explanations for our find-
ings and discuss the important implications they hold for our legal
system.
I
THE OMISSION AND NoRMALITY BIASES IN LAW AND HuMAN
DECISION MAKING
Human nature is inherently conservative. 17 Therefore, it should
not be surprising that law, like consumer preferences, 18 medical phi-
losophy, 19 and science more generally, 20 is also conservative. 21 The
law favors inaction over action and the usual over the unusual.2 2 Ex-
isting principles are presumed to be appropriate and are relatively un-
17 See MATT RIDLEY, THE RED QUEEN: SEX AND THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN NATURE 7
(1993) ("Humanity is, of course, morally free to make and remake itself infinitely, but we
do not do so. We stick to the same monotonously human pattern of organizing our af-
fairs."); EdwardJ. McCaffery, The Burdens of Benefits, 44 VILL. L. REV. 445, 450 (1999) ("Psy-
chologists and other social theorists have long known that there is a 'status quo bias'-a
tendency to be averse to change, to view any disruption to the way things are with suspicion
and fear.")
18 See, e.g., William 0. Bearden & Terence A. Shimp, The Use of Extrinsic Cues to Facili-
tate Product Adoption, 19J. MARKETING RES. 229, 229 (1982) ("The fact that adoption of new
products is inherently risky and many consumers are risk averse . . . is a frequent impedi-
ment to successful new product introductions." (citations omitted)); S. Ram &Jagdish N.
Sheth, Consumer Resistance to Innovations: The Marketing Problems and Its Solutions, J. CON-
SUMER MARKETING, Spring 1989, at 5, 6 (noting that "[o]ne of the major causes for market
failure of innovations is the resistance they encounter from consumers" and that "potential
changes from a satisfactory status quo" are a key cause of consumer reluctance to adopt
new products); Sanjiv Kuman, Rural IsJust Not Urban, Bus. TODAY, Mar. 3, 2002, at 112, 113
("If a company desires to change consumer behaviour, it needs one of these two: a couple
of decades, or an industry-wide association willing to back a certain product (or service)
standard while consumer-resistance is slowly chipped away and the real tangible benefits of
the new product become apparent."). "New Coke" is, of course, a classic example of con-
sumer resistance to a change from the norm. See Nell Henderson, Coca-Cola Apologizes to
Real Thing's Fans, WASH. POST, July 12, 1985, at B1.
19 "First, do no harm" (Primum non nocere) is one of Hippocrates's essential rules for
physicians. See ToM L. BEAUCHAMP &JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS
120 (3d ed. 1989); STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 647 (23d ed. 1976); WEBSTER'S NEW
WORLD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH 639 (Victoria Neufeldt & David B. Guralnik eds.,
3d ed. 1991) (describing the Hippocratic Oath as an ethical code for the medical
profession).
20 See 2 THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 62 (2d ed.
1970) (noting how resistant science is to change until conditions are right for a paradigm
shift).
21 See Lawrence I. Kiern, Damages in Maritime Cases: Environmental Damages Under Fed-
eral Law, 72 TUL. L. REV. 693, 695 (1997) (noting the "inherently conservative nature of the
common law"); Rosa Ehrenreich, Dignity and Discrimination: Toward a Pluralistic Understand-
ing of Workplace Harassment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1, 56 (1999) (same).
22 SeeJonathan R. Nelson, Judge-Made Law and the Presumption of Arbitrability: David L.
Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd., 58 BROOK. L. REV. 279, 280 (1992) (noting that
judges may follow anachronistic doctrines just because the doctrines have been around so
long).
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scrutinized. 23 Old laws that would never receive support if offered
anew go unchallenged. 24 When suggestions for change do emerge,
they are received skeptically. 25 To be sure, there are often economic
advantages associated with a preference for inaction over action
(avoidance of start-up costs, for example) and for the usual over the
unusual (reduced uncertainty). However, there is much more to the
story than these economic incentives. Research shows that even when
economic considerations are absent or held constant, people's judg-
ments and choices are systematically biased in favor of inaction and
normality.2 6
A. The Omission Bias: Action vs. Inaction
One example of the law's conservatism is its dramatic fault line
between action and inaction, as embodied in its rules concerning le-
gal duty.27 If a vision-impaired Milo bumps into Sally on a riverbank,
falls into the water and begins to drown, then Sally has no legal obliga-
tion to help Milo. She has no duty to rescue, even if she is an expert
swimmer and accurately believes that she could rescue Milo without
any significant risk to her personal safety.28 On the other hand, if
Sally accidentally bumps Milo into the river, then she probably does
23 See John H. Bauman, Go Down, Moses: Teaching About the Historical Roots of Modern
Remedies Doctrines, 39 BRANDEIs L.J. 649, 651 (2001) (noting the conservative nature of the
common law's incremental approach); Joseph H. Sommer, Against Cyberlaw, 15 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1145, 1158 (2000) (noting that "[t]he law-especially the common law-tends
to be conservative, accretive, and inductive as opposed to revolutionary, novel, and
deductive").
24 See Luther L. McDougal III, Leflar's Choice-Influencing Considerations: Revisited, Refined
and Reaffirmed, 52 ARK. L. REV. 105, 110 (1999) (noting that many outdated and anachro-
nistic laws stay on the books either because legislatures have not gotten around to repeal-
ing or amending them, or because courts have not been asked to review them).
25 See Edward J. McCaffery, Equality, of the Right Sort, 6 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 289, 289
(1996) ("We seem, as a society, a remarkably complacent lot. We are forever slow to recog-
nize problems and forever fast to write them off. We like things the way they are, by and
large, and we don't like change ....").
26 See infra Part II. The omission and normality biases are just two examples of devia-
tions of human reasoning from the optimal rational man model. Moreover, debiasing is
extremely difficult. See generally Colin F. Camerer & Robin M. Hogarth, The Effects of Finan-
cial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework, 19 J. RIsK &
UNCERTAINTY 7, 33-34 (1999) (noting that "all established anomalies have survived" at-
tempts to make them disappear by raising incentives).
27 See Saul Levmore, Waiting for Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive Structure
of the Law of Affirmative Obligations, 72 VA. L. REV. 879, 880 (1986) (noting that "our legal
system is seen as one that regularly deters antisocial commissions, often compensates vic-
tims of commissions, rarely deters antisocial omissions, and virtually never rewards
rescuers").
28 See Marcia M. Ziegler, Comment, Nonfeasance and the Duty to Assist: The American
Seinfeld Syndrome, 104 DICK. L. REV. 525, 528 (2000) ("In both civil and criminal law, the
failure of uninvolved bystanders to assist at accident or crime scenes is completely nonac-
tionable, even if harm is foreseeable.").
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have a duty to rescue him.29 Although the legal elements of intent,
causation, and damage are essentially equivalent in the two scenarios,
the law imposes a duty to rescue on Sally when she is an actor, but not
when she is a nonactor.
Why the distinction? Economists suggest an efficiency rationale.
William Landes and Richard Posner, for example, argue that impos-
ing liability on nonactors would be inefficient because it would dis-
courage people from going to places where rescues might be
needed. 30 Commentators have roundly criticized this argument as re-
sult-oriented, 3' illogical, 32 and based on unrealistic assumptions. 33
29 PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 377 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed.
1984) [hereinafter TORTS] ("It also is recognized that if the defendant's own negligence
has been responsible for the plaintiff's situation, a relation has arisen which imposes a duty
to make a reasonable effort to give assistance, and avoid any further harm.").
30 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other
Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 120 (1978).
31 See Ian Ayres, A Theoretical Fox Meets Empirical Hedgehogs: Competing Approaches to Acci-
dent Economics, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 837, 841 (1988) (book review) (arguing that Landes and
Posner have become "emotionally invested" in their efficiency thesis and therefore strain
to rationalize the common law as consistent with that theory).
32 Ayres notes:
Landes and Posner trot out an elaborate model to suggest that this com-
mon law rule of no liability may be efficient even when encouraging rescue
is efficient. They argue that imposing liability on potential rescuers will
cause them to avoid activities in which they might encounter a duty to res-
cue-so that there might actually be less rescuing if liability is imposed. A
closer look at their model, however, leads to exactly the opposite conclu-
sion. The assumption that potential rescuers will be motivated by the poten-
tial of liability to change their behavior indicates that they would fail to
rescue if they came upon a victim and there was no threat of liability. Thus,
within their model there would be no rescues in a no-liability world, be-
cause potential rescuers encountering a victim would not choose to incur
the costs of rescue. Landes and Posner must compare a zero-rescue equilib-
rium under the no-liability rule with possibility of rescue (albeit with ex ante
substitution) under the liability rule. Since something is always bigger than
nothing, the logic of their model indicates that the common law is
inefficient.
Id. at 841; see also Richard L. Hasen, The Efficient Duty to Rescue, 15 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
141, 142 (1995) (rejecting Landes and Posner's arguments and arguing that the duty to
rescue is efficient).
33 SeeJohn J. Donohue III, The Law and Economics of Tort Law: The Profound Revolution,
102 HARV. L. REV. 1047, 1054 n.24 (1989) (book review) (noting that Landes and Posner's
argument is "intricate-and perhaps, as some will contend fantastical"); Liam Murphy,
Beneficence, Law, and Liberty: The Case of Required Rescue, 89 GEo. L.J. 605, 643 n.179 (2001)
(arguing that Landes and Posner's assumptions are "dubious"); AssafJacob & Alon Harel,
An Economic Rationale for the Legal Treatment of Omissions in Tort Law, SSRN 5 n.10 (2001), at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/paper.cmabstractid=293794 (describing Landes and Pos-
ner's assumption that potential rescuers will avoid areas where rescues might be needed as
based on "dubious psychological conjecture" and arguing that one needs a "fertile
mind ... to reconcile efficiency with the common law principle which rejects the duty to
rescue").
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We add to these criticisms the observation that efficiency considera-
tions play little role in the judgments of judges and jurors.34
Common law is based on intuitive judgment or common sense.3 5
In fact, significant "psychological evidence suggests that legal rules re-
flect common sense attributions of responsibility and blame. 36
Therefore, we suggest that the intuitive method of decision making
helps account for the common law's distinction betyeen action and
inaction. Although there are legitimate policy reasons for distinguish-
ing between bad outcomes that arise from actions and those that arise
from omissions, 37 the scientific evidence points toward a cognitive ex-
planation because "[p]eople continue to distinguish acts and omis-
sions ... even when the feature that typically makes them different is
absent."3 People are so averse to injuring others actively, that they
will remain passive even when they know that more people will proba-
bly be hurt by their passivity.39
4 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
35 See Harold J. Berman, Toward an Integrative Jurisprudence: Politics, Morality, Histoy, 76
CAL. L. REV. 779, 791 (1988) (noting that "the English common law was supposed to reflect
the common sense of the English people"); Edward J. Schwartzbauer & Sidney Shindell,
Cancer and the Adjudicative Process: The Interface of Environmental Protection and Toxic Tort Law,
14 Am. J.L. & MEo. 1, 32 (1988) ("The common law is heavily laced with common sense.").
S36 Hoffman & O'Shea, supra note 5, at 391.
3 7 Prosser and Keeton suggest:
The reason for the distinction may be said to lie in the fact that by "misfea-
sance" [action] the defendant has created a new risk of harm to the plain-
tiff" while by "nonfeasance" [inaction] he has at least made his situation no
worse, and has merely failed to benefit him by interfering in his affairs.
The highly individualistic philosophy of the older common law had no
great difficulty in working out restrains upon the commission of affirmative
acts of harm, but shrank from converting the courts into an agency for
forcing men to help one another.
TORTS, supra note 29, at 373. As a policy matter, the slight factual distinction in these two
scenarios seems insufficient to account for the fundamental difference in the law.
318 Jonathan Baron, Nonconsequentialist Decisions, 17 BEFIAV. & BRAIN Sci. 1, 3 (1994).
39 "People have an intuitive moral rule 'Do no harm' or, more specifically, 'Do no
harm through action."' JONATHAN BARON, JUDGMENT MISGUIDED: INTUITION AND ERROR IN
PuLIc DECISION MAKING 2 (1998); see alsoJonathan Baron, Blind Justice: Fairness to Groups
and the Do-No-Harm Principle, 8 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 71, 81-82 (1995) (reporting
several experiments indicating that people are "reluctant to harm one group to benefit
another more," even when they realize that their decision cannot be justified on utilitarian
grounds).
Tetlock reports:
I have asked subjects to role-play Food and Drug Administration regulators
whose task is to decide on the admissibility of an anticoagulant drug into
the U.S. pharmaceutical market. When considering a drug that is not al-
ready on the market (a non-status-quo option), the drug must save at least
twice as many lives as it endangers. Moreover, this effect is amplified when
subjects are under pressure of accountability and are expected to justify
their decisions to others (here, the necessary ratio of lives saved to lives
endangered sometimes rises as high as 9 to 1). We also find that accounta-
ble subjects confronted by a non-status-quo drug that will harm some peo-
ple (although it will benefit many more) look for ways to avoid making the
decision, such as buck-passing (referring the decision to another govern-
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Thus, studies show that "acts and nonacts, if not ontologically or
logically distinct, are psychologically distinguishable. " 411 Sally seems
more responsible for Milo's misfortune when she is active rather than
passive.4 1 From a psychological standpoint, causes should resemble
effects. 4 2 Consequently, in cases such as this in which the "effect" is a
dramatically altered state for Milo, it is hard for people to identify
Sally as the responsible causal agent unless she too altered her state
through action.
The distinction people draw between harms that result from ac-
tions and harms that result from omissions is frequently referred to as
an omission bias-the tendency to judge harmful acts as worse than
equally harmful omissions. 43 The implications of an omission bias for
the resolution of legal disputes are far-reaching. Ajury may side with
professionals who breach their fiduciary duties through a failure to
warn, but it may treat more harshly fiduciary agents who breach their
duties through false warnings. A judge may find a social worker who
switches a child from a safe foster home into an abusive home to be
liable, but he may make a different finding if the social worker merely
failed to move the child out of an abusive home that he or she was
ment agency) and procrastination (delay the decision until more evidence
is at hand).
Philip E. Tetlock, The Consequences of Taking Consequentialism Seriously, 17 BEHAV. & BRAIN
Sci. 31, 31 (1994) (describing the results of empirical studies).
40 Janet Landman, Regret and Elation Following Action and Inaction: Affective Responses to
Positive Versus Negative Outcomes, 13 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 524, 526 (1987)
(describing several studies).
41 See KEITH E. STANOVICH, WHO Is RATIONAL?: STUDIES OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN
REASONING 195 (1999) (noting that "the act-omission distinction is hypothesized to arise
because harmful acts are usually more intentional than harmful omissions, and this distinc-
tion continues to be made even when there is no difference in intention").
42 See RiCHARD NISBETr & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOM-
INGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 115-18 (1980); see also Neal R. Feigenson, The Rhetoric of Torts:
How Advocates Help Jurors Think About Causation, Reasonableness, and Responsibility, 47 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 61, 121 (1995) (noting that in making causal inferences, laypeople often resort
to schemas, one of which "is that causes resemble their effects, and hence a mishap that
had a big effect, e.g., a severe injury, must have a big cause, namely, serious misconduct").
43 SeeJONATHAN BARON, TIHlINKING AND DECIDING 400 (3d ed. 2000) (providing a simi-
lar definition).
Laura Niedermayer and Gretchen Chapman note that "[t]he omission bias is the ten-
dency to judge actions as worse than omissions when they both have the same bad conse-
quences." Laura Y. Niedermayer & Gretchen B. Chapman, Action, Inaction, and Factors
Influencing Perceived Decision Making, 14J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 295, 296 (2001). They
hypothesized that one of the reasons for the omission bias might be the tendency to be-
lieve that "actions are the result of an explicit decision, while inactions result from some-
thing less intentional." Id. at 305. However, their study did not support this notion. Id. In
some contexts the decision not to take action was viewed as more intentional than a deci-
sion to take an action. Id.
The omission bias is particularly strong when protected values-values that people
think should not be traded off-are involved in a decision process. See Ilana Ritov &
Jonathan Baron, Protected Values and Omission Bias, 79 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DE-
CISION PROCESSES 79, 79, 92-93 (1999).
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already in. Therefore, plaintiffs who are aware of the omission bias
may take advantage of it by framing defendants' actions in active
rather than passive terms. For example, failures to act might be de-
scribed as willful conduct ("he elected to do nothing").
The actor effect is a related phenomenon that helps explain why
people judge actions more harshly than omissions. It holds that peo-
ple will have stronger emotional responses to actions than omis-
sions. 44 Importantly, these effects are psychological rather than
economic in character. Therefore, it is unlikely that raising incen-
tives, reducing decision costs, or otherwise changing the situational
economics will eliminate these effects.
45
B. The Normality Bias: Normal vs. Abnormal
In their famous book, H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honor6 argued that
the common law of causation reflects people's common-sense reason-
ing.46 In analyzing the case law, which they generally approved, 47 they
noted that when people are asked to identify causes, they tend to
choose either a voluntary human action or an abnormal factor.48 As
one commentator has noted,
According to Hart and Honor6, the central notion in the common-
sense concept of causation is that the cause is the factor which
"makes a difference" by interfering with, intervening in, or other-
wise changing the normal or reasonably expected course of events.
Thus, a contributing factor is treated as the cause rather than as a
mere condition if it was (1) a voluntary human intervention that was
intended to produce the consequences (for example, deliberately
44 Marcel Zeelenberg et al., Attributions of Responsibility and Affective Reactions to Decision
Outcomes, 104 ACTA PSYCi-iOLOGIcA 303, 304 (2000) ("Outcomes achieved through action
generally lead to more intense affective reactions than the same outcomes achieved
through inaction." (citations omitted)). The term "actor effect" was originally coined by
Janet Landman. Landman, supra note 40, at 529.
45 See Camerer & Hogarth, supra note 26.
46 H.L.A. HART & TONY HONOR9, CAUSATION IN THE LAW, at xxxiv (2d ed. 1985) (not-
ing that "courts have continually claimed that it is the ordinary man's conception of cause
that is used by the law and enters into various forms of legal responsibility"). Hart and
Honorh's position responded to the views of earlier writers who took the position that
causation inquiries were more policy-dependent than fact-dependent and were based on
judgments of legal purpose or social expediency. See, e.g., Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on
Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60 (1956). See generally Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort
Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1735, 1742-58 (1985) (comparing and contrasting these views and
others).
47 See Alan Brudner, Owning Outcomes: On Intervening Causes, Thin Skulls, and Fault-
Undifferentiated Crimes, 11 CANADIANJ.L. &JURIsPRUDENCE 89, 94 (1998) (noting that Hart
and Honor endorsed the system they described).
48 HART & HONORt,supra note 46, at 33 ("[l1n distinguishing between causes and con-
ditions two contrasts are of prime importance. These are the contrasts between what is
abnormal and what is normal in relation to any given thing or subject-matter, and between
a free deliberate human action and all other conditions.").
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breaking a vase) or (2) an abnormal action, event, or condition in
the particular context (for example, a freak storm or driving at an
excessive speed) .49
Hart and Honor6's characterization of the case law is consistent
with empirical research suggesting not only an omission bias in
human judgment, but also a normality bias in which people prefer the
usual to the unusual, the arguments of the majority to those of the
minority, the conventional to the unconventional, and the normal to
the abnormal.5 0 Thus, just as legal decision makers are more likely to
assign blame for bad outcomes to actions rather than to omissions, so
too are they likely to see close relationships between bad outcomes
and conditions or actions that are abnormal.
Human intuition is such that it is hard for us to see negative
agency in normal conduct. To be normal is to be acceptable, right,
and in step with the world. The bonds between harm and a set of
normal conditions are likely to be viewed as tenuous at best. In con-
trast, to be abnormal is to be different, unacceptable, and perhaps
even dangerous. Thus, when harm arises in the presence of abnormal
conditions, the mind locks in on those conditions as causal, and the
agent who brought about those abnormal conditions is held responsi-
ble for the harm.
Psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Dale Miller were among the
first to observe this tendency to associate greater responsibility with
abnormal actions. 51 They hypothesized that this association arises be-
cause it is easy to imagine doing the normal thing, and thereby avoid
the harm that occurred. 52 Therefore, like the omission bias, the nor-
49 Wright, supra note 46, at 1745-46. Wright criticizes Hart and Honor6 for mixing
decisions regarding responsibility with decisions regarding causality. See id. at 1746-47
(noting that "[a]s applied to human conduct in a tort case, the two criteria [abnormal
conditions and voluntary human action] simply call for inquiries into the intentional or
negligent character of the conduct"); see also Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility,
Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof: Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts,
73 IOWA L. REV. 1001, 1008-09 (1988) (criticizing Hart and Honor6's arguments on similar
grounds). Philosophically this is a fair point, but there is descriptive truth in Hart and
Honor6's position. Many studies demonstrate that when a defendant's responsibility is
greater, the causal link between his actions and the harm seems stronger, and vice versa.
See infra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
50 For a discussion of empirical research that demonstrates the existence of omission
and normality biases in human decision making, see infra Part II.
51 Daniel Kahneman & Dale T. Miller, Norm Theory: Comparing Reality to Its Alternatives,
93 PSYCHOL. REV. 136 (1986). Kahneman and Miller's norm theory posits that people
judge the normality of an event by mentally simulating a set of norms against which to
compare the target event. See id. at 147. They showed that this mental simulation process
can lead to exaggerated responses (including such emotional responses as regret) to ac-
tions that violate norms. See id. at 145-46. Although our current Article emphasizes the
significance of a normality bias for law, we owe an intellectual debt to Kahneman and
Miller's insights on the cognitive origins of normality judgments.
52 See id. at 144-45.
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mality bias has implications forjudge and jury decisions involving cau-
sation, responsibility, damages, and punishments. For example,
people may view a financial advisor who obtains a bad outcome for a
client when following a conventional path more sympathetically than
a financial advisor who obtains a similarly bad outcome by following
an unconventional path. 53 The normality bias creates an incentive for
plaintiffs to frame defendants' actions as unusual or nontraditional.
As we discuss later, a potentially undesirable side effect of this bias is
that it discourages people from deviating from accepted protocols of




PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE OMISSION AND
NORMALITY BIASES
Why do decision makers favor inaction over action and the nor-
mal over the abnormal? The issue is an important one for the law,
because its answers can provide insight into questions about when par-
ties will choose to proceed with a lawsuit,55 how litigants should con-
struct arguments to maximize persuasive appeal, 56 and how judges
and juries will likely decide cases. 57
We reject the argument that decision biases such as those we ad-
dress here merely speak to the unpredictability of human behavior. 58
53 We test this possibility in the second of two studies reported in Part III.
54 See infra notes 249-51 and accompanying text. In offering this point, we are not
suggesting that behavioral deviations from norms are appropriate any time a decision
maker is so inclined. More often than not, that which is normal and usual is probabilisti-
cally superior (in terms of outcomes) to that which is abnormal or unusual. However, in
situations in which norms for behavior exist, and yet a great deal of uncertainty about
outcomes remains, it would seem appropriate to encourage actors to apply some well-rea-
soned, individual judgment without fear of facing the wrath of a normality-biased jury if
things turn out badly. The medical treatment context that we explore in the first study in
Part Ill is one in which such leeway would seem reasonable.
55 See Chris Guthrie, Better Settle than Sony: The Regret Aversion Theory of Litigation Behav-
ior, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 43 (explaining how fear of regret can affect the decision to settle or
to pursue a trial).
56 Behavioral research often creates insights that attorneys can use in framing argu-
ments forjuries. See, e.g., Nyla R. Branscombe et al., Rape and Accident Counterfactuals: Who
Might Have Done Otherwise and Would It Have Changed the Outcome?, 26 J. APPLIED Soc.
Psyciot. 1042, 1063 (1996) (advising attorneys on how to manipulate jurors' use of
counterfactual reasoning to lower the blame assigned to their client).
57 This Article is replete with references to studies showing how jurors' decision mak-
ing is affected by heuristics and biases. It is clear that judges are similarly affected. See
Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 829 (2001) (reporting
results of a study demonstrating that 'judges rely on the same cognitive decision-making
process as laypersons and other experts, which leaves them vulnerable to cognitive illusions
that can produce poor judgments").
58 Economists sometimes argue that "people ... do not make systematic mistakes-
i.e., that they do not keep making the same mistake over and over again." The Benevolence of
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Instead, we believe that these biases provide a rich source of informa-
tion that can supplement (and, in some instances, replace) traditional
economic assumptions about decision behavior, including legal deci-
sion making. As we examine the relevant psychological research on
heuristics and biases in human decision making, we take care to ex-
plain the differences among these phenomena that some other legal
commentators have failed to appreciate. 59 We show that these phe-
nomena help explain the origins and characteristics of the omission
and normality biases that we claim play a central role in legal
judgment.
A. The Status Quo Bias
The status quo bias holds that, all things being equal, people pre-
fer what they perceive to be the current state of affairs to a different
state of affairs. 60 That is, "[p] eople tend to stick to the old, even when
they would choose the new if they were starting afresh."6 1 For exam-
ple, when electricity consumers were given a choice between a regime
of higher rates with higher reliability service or one of lower rates with
lower reliability service, they tended to choose whichever regime rep-
resented the status quo.6 2 Similarly, when offered alternative auto in-
Self-Interest, ECONOMIST, Dec. 12, 1998, at 80, 80. Therefore, they claim that errors in ra-
tionality are random and cancel each other out. See Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice,
Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1551, 1556-57 (1998). However, the
evidence is quite clear that the biases tend to be systematic and consistent, rather than
random. See Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CI. L. REv. 1175, 1175
(1997) ("Cognitive errors and motivational distortions may press behavior far from the
anticipated directions .... But it does not follow that people's behavior is unpredictable,
systematically irrational, random, rule-free, or elusive to social scientists. On the contrary,
the qualifications can be described, used, and sometimes even modeled.").
59 See, e.g., Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public Policy: Economic and Cognitive
Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 35 n.118 (1995) (suggesting mistakenly that the endow-
ment effect may also be referred to as the status quo bias or loss aversion).
60 See William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1
J. RisK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 8 (1988).
James Fanto recently noted that companies often seek to convince shareholders to
vote in favor of mega-mergers by arguing that the merger would not change the status quo
or perhaps would even help preserve the status quo. James A. Fanto, Quasi-Rationality in
Action: A Study of Psychological Factors in Merger Decision-Making, 62 01110 ST. L.J. 1333, 1360
(2001).
61 BARON, supra note 43, at 468; see also Mark Chaves &James D. Montgomery, Ration-
ality and the Framing of Religious Choices, 35J. ScI. STUDY RELIGION 128, 141 (1996) (finding
that a status quo bias helps explain the relatively "low levels of intergenerational" mobility
among religious denominations).
62 See Raymond S. Hartman et al., Consumer Rationality and the Status Quo, 106 Q.J.
ECON. 141, 158-60 (1991).
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surance coverages" 3 health insurance plans, 64 or retirement plans,65
most people select the one that is represented as the status quo
alternative.
These are significant findings because they contradict the bed-
rock economic principle that people have well-defined utilities and
preferences. 66 Instead, preferences are shaped, 67 in part, by superfi-
cial features of the task (such as which option is labeled "status
quo"). 68 One implication of this result is that sellers can use the status
quo bias as a vehicle for influencing consumer preferences. Likewise,
by altering the legal status quo in such areas as contract law69 and
employment law,7t 0 lawmakers can persuade parties to select options
that they might otherwise find objectionable. Similarly, consumers
may find a warranty disclaimer in a standard form contract to be ac-
ceptable or even appropriate even though they would be unlikely to
63 Colin F. Camerer, Prospect Theory in the Wild: Evidence from the Field, in CHOICES, VAL,
UES, AND FRAMES, supra note 4, at 288, 294.
64 Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 60, at 26-31.
65 See Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, How Much Is Investor Autonomy Worth?,
SSRN 6 (Mar. 2001), at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=294857 (not-
ing that studies indicate that most people make no changes in their retirement account
portfolios over a ten-year period but rather accept the status quo).
66 See Katharine K. Baker, Gender, Genes, and Choice: A Comparative Look at Feminism,
Evolution, and Economics, 80 N.C. L. REV. 465, 485-87 (2002) (noting that economists have
traditionally assumed that people "maximize their utility from a stable set of preferences,"
and reviewing some of the extensive literature that falsifies that assumption).
67 See Benartzi & Thaler, supra note 65, at 17 (noting that "[m]any psychologists now
believe that people do not really have well-formed preferences, but rather construct prefer-
ences when choices are elicited").
68 Online merchants take advantage of the status quo bias by providing websites that
say "[u]ncheck the box if you would prefer not to receive emails from our partners." Eric
Johnson, Methods May Have Changed, but Have the Customers?, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2002, at 6.
By making the default position an agreement to receive the emails, online merchants have
substantially affected customers' decisions to opt in and opt out of future mailings. See id.
69 Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power
of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1599-1602 (1998) [hereinafter
Korobkin, Inertia and Preference]. Korobkin argues:
[W]hen lawmakers anoint a contract term the default, the substantive pref-
erences of contracting parties shift-that term becomes more desirable,
and other competing terms becoming less desirable. Put another way, con-
tracting parties view default terms as part of the status quo, and they prefer
the status quo to alternative states, all other things equal.
Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608,
611-12 (1998) [hereinafter Korobkin, Status Quo Bias].
Even dyed-in-the-wool contractarians have recognized the impact of the status quo
bias on contract negotiations. See Richard W. Painter, Rules Lawyers Play By, 76 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 665, 672 (2001) ("[B]ecause actors can be biased in favor of the status quo, default
rules sometimes become contract terms simply because they are default rules, not because
they are inherently superior.").
70 See Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 106 (2002) (noting
the strong impact of the endowment effect in many areas, including employer-employee
relations).
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accede to a seller's request to pencil in such a disclaimer on a form
contract that does not already include it.71
We suspect the status quo bias exerts a significant influence on
jury decision making. If consumers tend to accept a particular auto
insurance coverage or retirement plan because it is labeled the status
quo, it seems likely that jury decisions regarding what constitutes an
acceptable contract provision or course of action may also be influ-
enced by jurors' beliefs about the status quo.
The status quo bias often presents itself alongside the normality
bias because current states are usually normal states. To date, no re-
search has pitted these two biases against one another to determine
whether or not people will continue to prefer existing states even
when those states are abnormal.
The status quo bias is also intertwined with the omission bias, be-
cause maintenance of the status quo usually requires no action.
Which bias exerts a stronger influence on behavior? According to re-
search by Professors Ritov and Baron, the omission bias is markedly
stronger than the status quo bias when the two conflict. Across a se-
ries of controlled studies that required decision makers to take action
in order to preserve the status quo, Ritov and Baron found that deci-
sion makers preferred not to take action. 72 They also found that "acts
that lead to the worse outcome are considered bad because they are
acts [rather than omissions], not because they change the status
quo." 73 Thus, the omission bias apparently exerts a stronger impact
on decision making than the status quo bias.74
71 See G. Richard Shell, Fair Play, Consent and Securities Arbitration: A Comment on Speidel,
62 BROOK. L. REV. 1365, 1367-69 (1996).
72 Ilana Ritov & Jonathan Baron, Status-Quo and Omission Biases, 5 J. RISK & UNCER-
TAINTY 49, 51 (1992) (finding that subjects preferred inaction over action even when inac-
tion resulted in a change to the status quo, and concluding that the status quo bias is partly
a result of the omission bias).
73 Jonathan Baron & Ilana Ritov, Reference Points and Omission Bias, 59 ORGANIZA-
TIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 475, 496 (1994).
74 Ritov and Baron conducted a number of experiments in an attempt to determine
whether a status quo bias or an omission bias exerts a greater influence over decision
makers' feelings and behaviors. In general, they reported that the omission bias had
stronger effects. Baron & Ritov, supra note 73, at 496-97; Ritov & Baron, supra note 72, at
51.
In a study involving jury decision making, Ritov and Baron found that jurors awarded
more compensation to victims of relatively more-expected injuries (a safety device failed
and a train ran into a tree on the tracks) than to victims of relatively less-expected injuries
(the safety device worked, but the sudden stop injured passengers). Ilana Ritov &
Jonathan Baron, Judgements of Compensation for Misfortune: The Role of Expectation, 24 EUR. J.
Soc. PSYCHOL. 525, 537-38 (1994) [hereinafter Ritov & Baron, Judgements of Compensation].
They interpreted these results as suggesting that "reversals of the usual tendency to think
of omissions as less harmful can be found when omissions are unexpected." Id. at 538.
Perhaps a better explanation of these results, however, lies in the betrayal aversion phe-
nomenon. Because jurors would feel a sense of betrayal when safety devices actually
caused injury, they would tend to award higher damages in such cases than in cases in
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B. The Endowment Effect
The endowment effect holds that for a given individual, the per-
ceived value of an item increases when it becomes part of that individ-
ual's endowment. 75 Accordingly, people will demand more to part
with what they have than they would be willing to pay to acquire it in
the first place. 76 Although such a disparity between willingness-to-ac-
cept (WTA) and willingness-to-pay (WTP) is inconsistent with the
premises of traditional economic reasoning,77 it is well documented in
both laboratory and real world settings. 78
The endowment effect can affectjury decision making. One study
found that mock jurors, when asked to calculate damages by putting
themselves in the plaintiff's position, demanded much more money
when asked, "What amount of money would you demand to willingly
accept [plaintiffs] injury?" than when asked, "What amount of money
is needed to make you 'whole' again-that is, as fortunate as if noth-
ing.., had happened?" 79 Notice that the first question endowed the
which other devices caused injury. See Koehler & Gershoff, supra note 5 (providing evi-
dence of betrayal aversion in several settings).
75 Scotrr PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 96 (1993).
76 See generally Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the
Coase Theorem, 98J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990) (discussing the endowment effect generally);
Jack L. Knetsch & J.A. Sinden, Willingness to Pay and Compensation Demanded: Experimental
Evidence of an Unexpected Disparity in Measures of Value, 99 Q.J. ECON. 507, 512-13 (1984)
(reporting the results of one of the most famous studies of the endowment effect).
77 See Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Willingness to Pay vs. Willingness to Ac-
cept: Legal and Economic Implications, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 59, 62 (1993) ("Economic models
generally presume that people evaluate commodities independently of whether they own
those commodities-the 'basic independence' assumption.... If the basic independence
assumption fails, most economic models may also fail."); Leaf Van Boven et al., Mispredict-
ing the Endowment Effect: Underestimation of Owners' Selling Prices by Buyer's Agents, SSRN 2
(2002), at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=299700 ("Contrary to the
traditional economic assumption that preferences are fixed in the short-term, the endow-
ment effect indicates that preferences can change rapidly and systematically with changes
in an individual's transient asset position.").
78 See Hartman et al., supra note 62, at 158-60 (finding 3-to-I WTA/WTP disparity in
surveys of consumers of residential electrical service);John K. Horowitz & Kenneth E. Mc-
Connell, A Review of WTA/WI'P Studies, SSRN 2-3 (Oct. 2000), at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=257336 (finding in meta-study of 45 WrTA/WTP studies the
average TITA/WTP ratio was approximately seven and that this held over a wide variety of
experimental designs, subjects, and products); see alsoJack L. Knetsch, The Endowment Effect
and Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference Curves, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES, supra note
4, at 171 (stating that "[t]he minimum compensation people demand to give up a good
has been found to be several times larger than the maximum amount they are willing to
pay for a commensurate entitlement," and providing an example of hunters, who "when
questioned about the possible destruction of a duck habitat,... responded that they would
be willing to pay an average of $247 to prevent its loss but would demand $1044 to accept
it").
79 Edward J. McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and Suffering
Awards, 81 VA. L. REV. 1341, 1356, 1369 (1995); see also Richard A. Epstein, Babbitt v Sweet
Home Chapters of Oregon: The Law and Economics of Habitat Preservation, 5 Sup. CT. ECON.
REV. 1, 42-44 (1997) (noting that these differences between the "willing to accept" and
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jurors with a positive or healthy state, whereas the second endowed
the jurors with an injured state. Jurors who were asked the first ques-
tion presumably demanded more money because they sought com-
pensation for both the loss associated with the injury and the loss of
their positive endowment. Although standard jury instructions do not
include a lost endowment frame,8 plaintiffs' attorneys sometimes cre-
ate such a frame for jurors when they ask: "How much money would
you accept to suffer this pain?"81
C. Loss Aversion
People are obviously averse to losses. However, the phenomenon
widely referred to as loss aversion8 2 is more sophisticated. It holds
that people tend to suffer losses more keenly than they enjoy compa-
rable gains.83 Specifically, the pain that Sarah feels upon losing $100
is likely to be about twice as intense as the joy that Emily feels upon
gaining $100.
Loss aversion theory's implicit suggestion that the potential
downside associated with new activities is larger than the potential up-
side has many implications for the legal world. s 4 For example, it dis-
courages new legislation, because those who would be adversely
affected by the change have greater motivation to lobby against the
legislation than potential beneficiaries have to lobby for it. Loss aver-
sion also implies that by switching to the English rule's "loser pays"
arrangement for attorneys' fees, we could dramatically reduce the at-
tractiveness of litigation to plaintiffs by introducing the possibility of
"make whole" frames are too large to ignore in thinking about how damages should be
calculated).
80 McCaffery et al., supra note 79, at 1382.
81 Id. at 1377.
82 See Kahneman et al., supra note 76, at 1345; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES,
supra note 4, at 143, 150.
83 See Richard Coughlan & Terry Connolly, Predicting Affective Responses to Unexpected
Outcomes, 85 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 211, 217 (2001) (finding
that for the study's subjects, "losses loom larger than gains"); Landman, supra note 40, at
527 ("[W]hen people are making real decisions in betting or life-dilemma situations, they
weigh potential losses more heavily than potential gains."); Tversky & Kahneman, supra
note 82, at 150 ("The basic intuition concerning loss aversion is that losses (outcomes
below the reference state) loom larger than corresponding gains (outcomes above the
reference state).").
84 Oliver Wendell Holmes long ago recognized the implications that the phenome-
non of loss aversion has for the resolution of competing legal claims:
It is in the nature of man's mind. A thing which you have enjoyed and used
as your own for a long time, whether property or an opinion, takes root in
your being and cannot be torn away without your resenting the act and
trying to defend yourself, however you came by it. The law can ask no bet-
ter justification than the deepest instincts of man.
OW. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 477 (1897).
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loss into their decisional calculus.8 5 By calling attention to the losses
that might arise from a change in the current state, loss aversion rein-
forces both the tendency to inaction (omission bias) and a favoritism
toward the current state (normality bias)86
D. Anchoring
The existence of status quo biases, endowment effects, and loss
aversion discussed above challenges the standard economic model of
rational choice. Moreover, these effects can lead to inconsistent and
suboptimal decisions. An even greater challenge to the standard eco-
nomic model is posed by a now voluminous psychological literature
showing that people reason heuristically rather than optimally.87 The
heuristic most relevant to the phenomena of interest in this Article is
anchoring. According to this heuristic, decision makers estimate
quantities by anchoring on a convenient value, and then adjusting for
case-specific information.88 Although this strategy often produces rea-
sonable estimates, studies have shown that decision makers tend to
focus their attention on the anchor value and to adjust insufficiently
85 See Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI. L.
REV. 163, 211 (2000) (noting that by making plaintiffs face a potential loss in the form of
attorneys' fees they would have to pay to a potential defendant if unsuccessful, one could
have both an economic impact and a psychological impact on plaintiff decision making).
86 Loss aversion promotes a status quo bias and thereby indirectly reinforces both the
omission bias and the normality bias. Professors George Quattrone and Amos Tversky
asked subjects to put themselves in the position of a voter in a hypothetical country's presi-
dential race. Subjects were presented with a choice between candidates Frank and Carl,
one of whom favored policies of higher inflation and lower unemployment and the other
who favored lower inflation at the cost of higher unemployment. George A. Quattrone &
Amos Tversky, Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of Political Choice, in CHOICES,
VALUES, AND FRAMES, supra note 4, at 451, 459. When Frank's plan for higher inflation and
higher employment was framed as the status quo, 65% of the voters chose it; when Carl's
plan for lowering inflation at the cost of higher unemployment was framed as the status
quo, 61% of voters chose it. Id. at 459. Quattrone and Tversky suggested that loss aversion
causes this status quo bias, and that it might account for part of the tremendous advantage
that incumbents seem to have in political races. Id. at 459-60.
In most settings, "[l]oss aversion implies the status quo bias." Tversky & Kahneman,
supra note 82, at 147 (noting, however, that there are other factors, such as transaction
costs and psychological commitment to prior choices, which can induce a status quo bias
even when loss aversion is absent). Anticipated regret, for example, can provide impetus
for the status quo bias in various contexts. See Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 60, at
38. For an explanation of the role of regret in status quo bias and other reasoning biases,
see infra Part II.F.
87 See, e.g., supra note 57 (discussing how heuristics affect juries' and judges' decision-
making processes). Even economics journals now widely recognize the existence of heuris-
tic reasoning. See John T. Harvey, Heuristic Judgment Theory, 32 J. ECON. IssuEs 47, 47-48
(1998) (noting that "experimental psychology suggests that the most important assump-
tions of rational choice theory are violated with frequency in real life," and offering a
model importing the research from the heuristics and biases literature as a replacement).
88 See Gretchen B. Chapman & Brian H. Bornstein, The More You Ask for, the More You
Get: Anchoring in Personal Juy Verdicts, 10 APPLIED CoGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 519, 519 (1996).
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to account for new information.8 9 The anchoring bias bolsters the
normality bias in that people often anchor on reference points, and
the current, typically normal, state is the most common reference
point.90
Because anchor values ordinarily precede specific, individualized
information, the anchoring bias suggests that the first items of infor-
mation are likely to receive more consideration than information that
89 See generally Ward Edwards, Conservatism in Human Information Processing, in JUDc.
MENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 4, at 359, 359 ("It turns out that opinion change is
very orderly, and usually proportional to numbers calculated from Bayes's theorem-but it
is insufficient in amount."); Joseph F. Funaro, An Empirical Analysis of Five Descriptive Models
for Cascaded Inference, 14 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 186, 186 (1975)
(noting that most studies find that "intuitive opinion revisions are conservative in compari-
son to the optimal revisions specified by Bayes' theorem").
Interestingly, research suggests that our tendency to seek out and attach great weight
to anchors is so strong that people sometimes use irrelevant anchors when making numeri-
cal estimates. For example, in a leading study, subjects were asked to estimate the exact
percentage of African countries in the United Nations. Before they answered, they were
assigned an apparently random number by the spin of a roulette wheel. Among those
assigned a 65, the median guess was 45%. Among those assigned a 10, the median estimate
was 25%. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, inJUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 4, at 3, 14; see also Gregory B. North-
craft & Margaret A. Neale, Experts, Amateurs, and Real Estate: An Anchoring-and-Adjustment
Perspective on Property Pricing Decisions, 39 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 84, 94-95 (1987) (finding that real estate agents are subject to anchoring effects
when estimating real estate prices); Brian Wansink et al., An Anchoring and Adjustment Model
of Purchase Quantity Decisions, 35 J. MARKETING RES. 71, 73 (1998) (finding that by simply
altering the consumer's anchor on quantity by, for example, advertising products as "6 for
$3" rather than "50 cents each," sales could be increased by 32%).
90 Not only does the law's failure to impose a duty to rescue illustrate that the law
favors inaction over action, the slow evolution of the law supports our claim that the law is
conservative, favoring the normal situation over the abnormal and the status quo over
change. For many years legal scholars have called for a broader form of the duty to rescue
than currently exists. See, e.g., James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97
(1908-1909); Theodore M. Benditt, Liability for Failing to Rescue, 1 LAW & PHIL. 391 (1982);
Francis H. Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REV.
217 (1908); Anthony D'Amato, The "Bad Samaritan" Paradigm, 70 Nw. U. L. REV. 798
(1975); Steven J. Heyman, Foundations of the Duty to Rescue, 47 VAND. L. REV. 673 (1994);
Harold F. McNiece &John V. Thornton, Affirmative Duties in Tort, 58 YALE L.J. 1272 (1949);
Robert A. Prentice, Expanding the Duty to Rescue, 19 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 15 (1985); Warren
A. Seavey, IAm Not My Guest's Keeper, 13 VAND. L. REV. 699 (1960); ErnestJ. Weinrib, The
Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE LJ. 247 (1980); A.D. Woozley, A Duty to Rescue: Some
Thoughts on Criminal Liability, 69 VA. L. REv. 1273 (1983).
Many nations impose a broad duty to rescue. See Daniel B. Yeager, A Radical Commu-
nity of Aid: A Rejoinder to Opponents of Affirmative Duties to Help Strangers, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1,
6 n.28 (1993) ("Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Germany, Holland, Hungary,
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Russia, Switzerland, and Tur-
key impose criminal penalties for failure to engage in 'easy rescue."'). Yet, American law
has not moved in that direction. See Nancy Levit, The Kindness of Strangers: Interdisciplinary
Foundations of a Duty to Act, 40 WASHBURN L.J. 463, 463 (2001) ("[Y]ou can watch blind
people walk into traffic and not be sued for failing to stop them. It's not nice, but it's not
tortious." (footnote omitted)). This seems to be an area in which precedent anchors
judges to particular solutions, making it less likely that they will adopt new and different
approaches.
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appears later.9 1 Although the order in which information is received
should be irrelevant to decisions that rely on that information, the
mind does not work this way. First impressions are powerful influ-
ences on judgment and seem to provide the prism through which sub-
sequent information is filtered. Even when first impressions are
erroneous, they continue to affectjudgment long after they have been
discredited. 92
We believe that the anchoring bias can have a significant influ-
ence on legal decision making. Consider a jury presented with a
plaintiffs ad damnum clause in a negligence case.93 Even when the
plaintiff's requested damages amount bears no more relation to the
plaintiffs actual damages than the spin of a roulette wheel, studies
show that this requested amount affects ajury's conclusions.9 4 Judges
are apparently affected by a similar anchoring bias.95
E. Sunk Cost Effects
A sunk cost is a cost that was incurred in the past and that will not
be affected by any future decision.96 Economists widely agree that
sunk costs should be ignored when deciding whether to take on addi-
91 This is often referred to as a primacy effect. See NisBE, r & Ross, supra note 42, at
172 ("Although order of presentation of information sometimes has no net effect on final
judgment, and recency effects sometimes are found, these are the exception; several de-
cades of psychological research have shown that primacy effects are overwhelmingly more
probable."); S.E. Asch, Forming Impressions of Personality, 41 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL.
258, 270 (1946) (finding that if someone is described by a list of characteristics, those
characteristics that are listed first are more influential on a study's subjects than those
listed later).
92 See Craig A. Anderson et al., Perseverance of Social Theories: The Role of Explanation in
the Persistence of Discredited Information, 39J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1037, 1045 (1980)
(finding that people will persevere in beliefs even after a decisive discrediting of the evi-
dence upon which the beliefs were formed); Lee Ross & Craig A. Anderson, Shortcomings in
the Attribution Process: On the Origins and Maintenance of Erroneous Social Assessments, inJUDC;-
MENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 4, at 129, 144 (noting that "beliefs-from relatively
narrow personal impressions to broader social theories-are remarkably resilient in the
face of empirical challenges that seem logically devastating").
93 An ad damnum clause is a plaintiffs requested damages award. Jeffrey R. Boyll,
Psychological, Cognitive, Personality and Interpersonal Factors injury Verdicts, 15 LAw & PSYCHOL.
REV. 163, 170 (1991).
94 Jurors often use a plaintiffs ad damnum clause as an anchor in making damages
awards. See id.; Chapman & Bornstein, supra note 88, at 537; Edith Greene, On Juries and
Damage Awards: The Process of Decisionmaking, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at
225, 234. When jurors are especially uncertain about the amount of damages to award, the
influence of anchors are especially strong. See Karen E. Jacowitz & Daniel Kahneman, Mea-
sures of Anchoring in Estimation Tasks, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1161, 1164-65
(1995).
95 Guthrie et al., supra note 57, at 816-17 (reporting results of an empirical study
showing that judges' vulnerability to the anchoring and adjustment phenomenon is com-
parable to that of lay persons).
96 See ROBYN M. DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 22 (1988).
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tional costs. 9 7 Nevertheless, numerous studies show that people do
allow sunk costs to influence their decisions across a wide range of
situations.98 For example, sunk cost reasoning has been offered as an
explanation for why people who have already spent money on tickets
go to plays they do not really want to see, 99 why sports coaches fail to
bench high draft picks, 100 and why major public construction projects,
once begun, are almost always completed, even if it becomes clear
that they are economically unjustified.10 1 In addition, U.S. policy in
the Vietnam War is often cited as an example of sunk cost reason-
ing. 10 2 Even after losses became staggering and the original goals of
the war became unattainable, the Pentagon muddled on for years.
The sunk costs made it difficult for decision makers to take action
(omission bias) to change what had become the accepted situation
(normality bias). Therefore, sunk cost reasoning has the potential to
affectjurors' decision making because the same arguments ("We can't
leave Vietnam, or all our soldiers will have died in vain," or "We can't
abandon the dam, or all the money we've spent will have been
97 See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Accounting: Some Economic Issues, 52
BROOK. L. REv. 1051, 1053 (1987); see also Linda Elizabeth DeAngelo, Auditor Independence,
'Low Balling, and Disclosure Regulation, 3J. AccT. & ECON. 113 (1981).
98 See DAWES, supra note 96, at 22-23 (noting that people who have changed their
minds about wanting to go to a resort for a weekend are much more likely to go anyway if
they already put down a deposit); PLOUS, supra note 75, at 243-44 ("Investment traps occur
when prior expenditures of time, money, or other resources lead people to make choices
they would not otherwise make."); Hal R. Arkes & Catherine Blumer, The Psychology of Sunk
Cost, 35 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 124, 124-25 (1985) (citing
examples of politicians who stated that it would be an "unconscionable mishandling" of
taxpayer funds to terminate a dam project in which $1 billion had been spent (sunk costs),
even though the total value of the project, if completed, would be less than the amount of
money yet to be spent to complete it).
99 See Arkes & Blumer, supra note 98, at 128.
100 See Barry M. Staw & Ha Hoang, Sunk Costs in the NBA: Why Draft Order Affects Playing
Time and Survival in Professional Basketball, 40 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 474, 487 (1995) ("Regressions
showed that the higher a player was taken in the college draft, the more time he was given
on the court, even after controlling for other logical predictors of playing time, such as
performance, injury, and trade status,").
101 BARUCH FISCHHOFF ET AL, ACCEPTABLE RISK 13 (1981) (observing people's unwill-
ingness to ignore sunk costs and noting that "[t]he fact that no major dam in the United
States has been left unfinished once begun shows how far a little concrete can go in defin-
ing a problem").
102 See MICHAEL HOWARD, THE CAUSES OF WARS 232 (1984) (quoting Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger as stating: "We could not simply walk away from an enterprise involving
two administrations, five allied countries, and thirty-one thousand dead as if we were
switching a television channel."); Investments in Status Quo Can Sink Your System, IN-
FoWORLD, Apr. 26, 1993, at 63. The InfoWorld article notes:
Management gurus point to the Vietnam War as the ultimate example of
what happens when sunk costs are used incorrectly as an argument to con-
tinue with a failing operation. Senior military leaders used the number of
American casualties incurred as a reason to continue the war. The argu-
ment: Don't let those men and women die in vain. Of course, as a result of
this reasoning, even more died and the United States lost the war.
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wasted") that affected defendants' decision making will also influence
jurors who evaluate those decisions.
F. Regret Theory
The rational-economic-man model suffered one of its most strik-
ing setbacks as a result of research that points to the central role of
emotion ° -3 in decision making.' 0 4 In fact, research shows that even
anticipated emotions appear to impact decision making. 10 5 Perhaps
the most frequently examined emotional influence on judgment and
choice is regret. 10 6 Regret is "the painful feeling a person experiences
103 One definition of emotions is "states that are subjectively experienced, that have
some hedonic component, and that drive or motivate certain kinds of behavior specific to
the emotion." Jonathan Baron, The Effect of Normative Beliefs on Anticipated Emotions, 63 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 320, 320 (1992). The traditional rational-man model views
"decision making as a cold cognitive process" devoid of emotions. Marcel Zeelenberg, The
Use of Crying over Spilled Milk: A Note on the Rationality and Functionality of Regret, 12 PHIL.
PSYCIOL. 325, 325 (1999).
104 See, e.g., Peter H. Huang, Reasons Within Passions: Emotions and Intentions in Property
Rights Bargaining, 79 OR. L. REV. 435, 435 (2000) ("[P]eople do not behave the way that
rational actors do because people also feel emotions and those emotions drive behavior.");
Bruce E. Kaufman, Emotional Arousal as a Source of Bounded Rationality, 38J. ECON. BEHAV. &
ORG. 135, 135 (1999) (noting that "an additional source of bounded rationality ... [is]
insufficient or excessive emotional arousal"); George F. Loewenstein et al., Risk as Feelings,
127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 267, 280 (2001) (arguing that emotional assessments of risk often di-
verge from cognitive assessments and that when such divergence occurs, emotional reac-
tions often drive behavior); Barbara A. Mellers et al., Decision Affect Theory: Emotional
Reactions to the Outcomes of Risky Options, 8 PSYCHOL. Sc. 423, 423 (1997) (citing numerous
sources that address the role of emotions in decision making); Eric A. Posner, Law and the
Emotions, 89 GEO. L.J. 1977, 1977 (2001) (noting that "emotions play an important role in
many areas of the law"); Rakesh K. Sarin, What Now for Generalized Utility Theory, in UTILITY
THEORIES: MEASUREMENTS AND APPLICATIONS 137, 145 (Ward Edwards ed., 1992) ("Psycho-
logical concerns such as anxiety, nervousness, regret and fear play an important role in
decision making. These concerns, though unaccounted for in the economics of decision,
are real to a person and should be incorporated in the analysis."); Zeelenberg, supra note
103, at 329 (noting that "[n]owadays, emotions are viewed as an important part of human
experience, and their influence on decision making is widely acknowledged in psychology
and economics").
105 See, e.g., Baron, supra note 103, at 320 ("Anticipation of emotions can affect deci-
sions even when the emotion is not an inherent part of the desired or undesired out-
comes."); Ren6 Richard et al., Anticipated Affect and Behavioral Choice, 18 BASIC & APPLIED
Soc. PSYCiiOL. 111, 125 (1996) (reporting results of studies finding that "anticipated affec-
tive reactions predicted a significant proportion of variance in behavioral expectations").
Researchers who have asked people to imagine fearful stimuli have found that just
anticipating the stimuli often activates fearful facial expressions, heavy respiration, and
increased heart rates in the subjects. See, e.g., PeterJ. Lang et al., Emotional Imagery: Concep-
tual Structure and Pattern of Somato-Visceral Response, 17 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 179, 190 (1980);
Gary E. Schwartz et al., Facial Muscle Patterning to Affective Imagery in J)epressed and
Nondepressed Subjects, 192 SCIENCE 489, 491 (1976).
106 Researchers have also studied the impact of the anticipation of various other emo-
tions upon human decision making. See, e.g., JOHN SABINI & MAURY SILVER, EMOTION,
CHARACrER, AND RESPONSIBILITY 88-92 (1998) (studying shame and guilt); JOHN SABINI,
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 254-55 (1992) (studying embarrassment); Dianne L. Chambless & Ed-
ward J. Gracely, Fear of Fear and the Anxiety Disorders, 13 COGNITIVE THERAPY & RES. 9 (1989)
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upon determining she could have obtained a better outcome if she
had decided or behaved differently. '10 7 People take this feeling-or
the mere anticipation of this feeling-into account when making deci-
sions.1 0 8 It is an emotional input that people rely on independently of
the utility or disutility associated with the various potential outcomes.
An example illustrates the phenomenon. Assume that a decision
maker is faced with two choices: Alternative A provides the decision
maker with a guaranteed million dollars, whereas Alternative B pro-
vides the decision maker with a 10% chance of receiving $2.5 million,
an 89% chance of receiving $1 million, and a 1% chance of receiving
nothing. Although Alternative B has a greater expected value ($1.14
million) and gives the decision maker a 99% chance of making as
much or more than he would make under Alternative A, most people
choose Alternative A. Inconsistent with standard economic theory,
most people would rather have the certainty of a million dollars than
the chance to receive even more.10 9 Why do most people take the
option that carries the smaller expected payoff? One explanation is
that decision makers take into account how much regret they would
feel if they accepted Alternative B and happened to receive zero. 1 0
(studying panic); Lola L. Lopes, Between Hope and Fear: The Psychology of Risk, 20 ADVANCES
IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 255 (1987) (studying hope); Paula M. Niedenthal et al., "If
Only I Weren't" Versus "If Only I Hadn't": Distinguishing Shame and Guilt in Counterfactual
Thinking, 67J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 585 (1994) (studying shame and guilt).
107 Guthrie, supra note 55, at 65-66 (drawing from definitions by philosophers, econo-
mists, psychologists, and psychotherapists); see also HERSH SHEFRIN, BEYOND GREED AND
FEAR: UNDERSTANDING BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INVESTING 30 (2000)
("[R]regret is [often] more than the pain of loss. It is the pain associated with feeling
responsible for the loss."); Barbara A. Mellers et al., Group Report: Effects of Emotions and
Social Processes on Bounded Rationality, in BOUNDED RATIONALITY, supra note 4, at 263, 269
(defining regret as "the feeling that occurs when one's outcome is worse than the other
outcome that would have occurred under another choice"); Zeelenberg, supra note 103, at
327 (noting that regret "is accompanied by feelings that one should have known better and
by having a sinking feeling, by thoughts about the mistake one has made and the opportu-
nities lost, by feeling a tendency to kick oneself and to correct one's mistake, and wanting
to undo the event and to get a second chance").
108 The essence of anticipated regret theory is that (a) people feel regret if, after mak-
ing a choice between two alternative courses of action, they learn that the choice they
made led to a worse outcome, and (b) people do not wish to feel regret and will modify
their utilities to avoid feeling it. See Richard P. Larrick & Terry L. Boles, Avoiding Regret in
Decisions with Feedback: A Negotiation Example, 63 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 87, 87 (1995); Mellers et al., supra note 107, at 269.
Because they anticipate that they will feel regret (or joy) following a decision, they
take into account the amount of regret (or joy) they think they may feel once the outcome
is known, and factor that into their decision-making process. Richard P. Larrick, Motiva-
tional Factors in Decision Theories: The Role of Self-Protection, 113 PSYCHOL. BULL. 440, 445
(1993).
109 See generally PLOUS, supra note 75, at 84-85 (discussing in more detail this example).
1 10 David E. Bell, Regret in Decision Making Under Uncertainty, 30 OPERATIONS RES. 961,
962 (1982). Bell explained:
A decision maker who takes the gamble over the sure $1 million may feel
absolutely devastated if the 1% chance of getting nothing results. It would
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According to early regret theorists Loomes & Sugden:
The essential notion underlying regret theory is that people tend to
compare their actual situations with the ones they would have been
in, had they made different choices in the past. If they realize that a
different choice would have led to a better outcome, people may
experience the painful sensation of regret; if the alternative would
have led to a worse outcome, they may experience a pleasurable
sensation we call "rejoicing." When faced with new choice situa-
tions, people remember their previous experiences and form expec-
tations about the rejoicing and regret that the present alternatives
might entail. They then take these expectations into account when
making their decisions.'11
The impact of anticipated regret can be significant.' 12 Thus, there are
studies indicating that anticipated regret influences which alternatives
are chosen in the context of consumer purchase decisions, I invest-
be considered normal, if not economically rational, for such a decision
maker to feel angry and perhaps depressed that he or she could have been
so stupid or greedy as to pass tip a sure $1 million. In the second choice
between gambles there is no equivalent endpoint. If the chosen lottery re-
sults in no reward, the decision maker may feel that nothing was also the
likely result of the other lottery.
Id. Bell offered several examples of the role that avoidance of decision regret might play in
decision making, ultimately conceding that "adding an extra variable, regret, to the utility
function inevitably allows for a better fit to observed behavior." Id. at 979.
Just about the time Bell propounded this theory, Loomes and Sugden, as well as
Kahneman and Tversky, proposed similar notions. See, e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, supra
note 8, at 170, 173; Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, The Simulation Heuristic, in JUDc-
MENT UNDER UNCFRTAINTY, supra note 4, at 201, 206 [hereinafter Kahneman & Tversky,
Simulation Heuristic]; Graham Loomes & Robert Sugden, Disappointment and Dynamic Consis-
tency in Choice Under Uncertainty, 53 RFv. ECON. STUD. 271 (1986); Graham Loomes & Rob-
ert Sugden, Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice Under Uncertainty, 92 ECON.
J. 805 (1982).
III Graham Loomes & Robert Sugden, A Rationale for Preference Reversal, 73 AM. ECON.
REv. 428, 428 (1983).
112 See Marcel Zeelenberg et al., Regret and Responsibility Resolved? Evaluating Ord6fiez and
Connolly's (2000) Conclusions, 81 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 143,
150 (2000) ("[T]here are various studies that have yielded process-related data that are
consistent at least with the gist of regret theory, in the sense that they show that people
take into account the possible future regrets and let their decisions be influenced by
them."). Interestingly, just as Kahneman and Tversky's prospect theory indicates that
losses have greater impact on human decision making than gains, Tversky & Kahneman,
supra note 82, at 150, studies indicate that regret has a greater impact than its opposite,
rejoicing.
11 J. Jeffrey Inman et al., A Generalized Utility Model of Disappointment and Regret Effects on
Post-Choice Valuation, 16 MARKETING SCI. 97, 104 (1997) (positing and performing a study
indicating that consumer satisfaction is substantially affected by information regarding the
performance of forgone alternatives that can generate regret); J. Jeffrey Inman & Leigh
McAlister, Do Coupon Expiration Dates Affect Consumer Behavior?, 31 J. MARKETING RES. 423,
427 (1994) (theorizing that anticipated regret might affect consumer coupon behavior and
finding such an effect in the data);J. Jeffrey Inman & Marcel Zeelenberg, Regret in Repeat
Purchase Versus Switching Decisions: The Attenuating Role of Decision Justifiability, 29 J. CON-
SUMER RES. 116 (2002); Itamar Simonson, The Influence of Anticipating Regret and Responsibil-
ity on Purchase Decisions, 19J. CONSUMER RES. 105, 116 (1992) (finding that subjects asked to
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ment decisions,' 14 gambling decisions, 115 negotiations, 16 sexual be-
havior, 117 and driving behavior. "s Although the link is controversial,
the evidence is relatively strong that there is a direct correlation be-
tween one's regret and the responsibility one feels for the unfortunate
outcome.' 19 "Thus, individuals tend to avoid consequences in which
they could appear after the fact to have made the wrong choice, even
if in advance the decision appeared correct given the information
available at the time."' 20
Although many commentators theorize that anticipated regret
generally causes people to be risk averse, this is not always true. In
experiments that manipulated riskiness and regret, people tended to
choose either the riskier choice or the less risky choice, depending
upon which choice minimized regret. 21 In others words, minimizing
anticipate how they would feel if they found that they had passed up an attractive price
because they incorrectly expected the same price to be available later were more likely to
take the current attractive price than a control group who were not instructed to anticipate
regret).
114 Marcel Zeelenberg & Jane Beattie, Consequences of Regret Aversion 2: Additional Evi-
dence for Effects of Feedback on Decision Making, 72 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 63, 74-75 (1997).
115 Robert A. Josephs et al., Protecting the Self from the Negative Consequences of Risky Deci-
sions, 62 J. PERSONALIY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 26 (1992).
116 Larrick & Boles, supra note 108.
117 Ren6 Richard et al., Anticipated Regret and Time Perspective: Changing Sexual Risk-tak-
ing Behavior, 9 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAING 185 (1996).
1 18 Dianne Parker et al., Modifying Beliefs and Attitudes to Exceeding the Speed Limit: An
Intervention Study Based on the Theory of Planned Behavior, 26 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1
(1996).
119 Thus, a person should regret choosing a class that turns out to be a bad experience
more than being placed in the class by a computer. The evidence tends to indicate that
this is true. For an enlightening exchange of views on this matter, see Terry Connolly et
al., Regret and Responsibility in the Evaluation of Decision Outcomes, 70 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV.
& HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 73 (1997) (purporting to find as much regret for bad results
when a computer assigned students as when they were self-assigned); Marcel Zeelenberg et
al., Reconsidering the Relation Between Regret and Responsibility, 74 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. &
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 254 (1998) [hereinafter Zeelenberg et al., Reconsidering the Rela-
tion] (refining Connolly and his coauthors' 1997 study and finding correlation between
regret and responsibility); Lisa D. Ord6fiez & Terry Connolly, Regret and Responsibility: A
Reply to Zeelenberg et al. (1998), 81 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 132
(2000) (conceding the existence of a correlation between regret and responsibility);
Zeelenberg et al., supra note 112, at 149 (claiming victory in that "the new studies of
Ord6fiez and Connolly support our claim that regret and responsibility are positively
related").
120 Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 60, at 38.
121 See Marcel Zeelenberg et al., Consequences of Regret Aversion: Effects of Expected Feedback
on Risky Decision Making, 65 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 148
(1996); see also Larrick & Boles, supra note 108 (finding in a negotiation setting that negoti-
ators who expected feedback on the forgone alternative were more risk-seeking than those
who did not expect feedback); Ilana Ritov, Probability of Regret: Anticipation of Uncertainty
Resolution in Choice, 66 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 228 (1996)
(finding that subjects choosing between gambles who expected to find out results of both
their choice and a forgone alternative, and therefore faced the possibility of regret, chose
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regret was more important to the decision makers than minimizing
risk. 122
1. Regret Theory and the Omission Bias
Regret is important for our purposes because it relates back to
the omission and normality biases. Significantly, most studies indicate
that regret is greater when an undesirable outcome is caused by action
rather than because of an omission or missed opportunity. 123
Kahneman and Tversky tested this hypothesis with the following
scenario:
Paul owns shares in Company A. During the past year he consid-
ered switching to stock in Company B, but he decided against it.
He now finds that he would have been better off by $1,200 if he had
switched to the stock of Company B. George owned shares in Com-
pany B. During the past year he switched to stock in Company A.
He now finds that he would have been better off by $1,200 if he had
kept his stock in Company B. Who feels more regret?' 24
Most people believed that George would suffer more regret than
Paul because George actively switched out of the more profitable
stock while Paul simply passed up an opportunity that presented it-
self. 125 Additional studies of this phenomenon in varying scenarios
have produced such consistent results 126 that experts have concluded
the high-risk, high-gain option more often than subjects who expected to learn only the
result of their own choice and therefore did not face regret).
122 Zeelenberg et al., supra note 121, at 156; Zeelenberg & Beattie, supra note 114, at
74-75; Marcel Zeelenberg, Anticipated Regret, Expected Feedback and Behavioral Decision Mak-
ing, 12J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 93, 104 (1999).
123 See, e.g., MASSIMO PIATTELLI-PALMARINI, INEVITABLE ILLUSIONS: HOw MISTAKES OF
REASON RULE OUR MINDS 28 (Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini & Keith Botsford trans., 1994)
(noting that humans' "mental economy has a built-in cost for action" in that we regret it
less if bad results stem from our inaction rather than our actions); Thomas Gilovich &
Victoria Husted Medvec, Some Counterfactual Determinants of Satisfaction and Regret, in WHAT
MIGHT HAVE BEEN: THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF COUNTERFACTUAL THINKING 259, 264 (Neal
J. Roese &James M. Olson eds., 1995) ("People apparently regret negative outcomes that
stem from commissions, or actions taken, more than equivalent outcomes that stem from
omissions, or actions foregone."); Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 8, at 173 ("[R]egret
associated with failures to act is often less intense than regret associated with the failure of
an action.").
124 Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 8, at 173.
125 Id. Baron and Ritov replicated this result in a similar study. Baron & Ritov, supra
note 73, at 481-83.
126 For example, Landman replicated Kahneman and Tversky's "George and Paul"
study in three slightly different scenarios involving choices between college courses, job
offers, and vacation sites. Roughly eighty percent of the respondents imagined greater
regret for negative outcomes following action rather than inaction. Landman, supra note
40, at 528-29.
Ritov and Baron also completed a series of experiments in this area. See, e.g., Ilana
Ritov & Jonathan Baron, Outcome Knowledge, Regret, and Omission Bias, 64 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 119, 126 (1995) [hereinafter Ritov & Baron, Outcome
Knowledge]. They found that
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that the fact that people experience more regret over negative out-
comes stemming from action than negative outcomes stemming from
inaction "is perhaps the clearest and most frequently replicated find-
ing in the entire literature on counterfactual thinking."1 27
2. Regret Theory and the Normality Bias
Not only do people tend to regret actions more than inactions,
they also (consistent with everything we have discussed to this point)
regret adverse consequences that stem from abnormal situations more
than those that stem from normal situations.' 28 Similarly, they regret
adverse consequences that arise from extraordinary behavior more
than those that result from common behavior. 129
people anticipate regret when they expect to be able to compare a bad
outcome to a better outcome that would have resulted from a foregone
option. They evaluate decisions as worse when such a situation exists, and
they are reluctant to choose options that might lead to such a situation,
especially when these options involve action rather than inaction.
Id. (emphasis added); see also David A. Asch et al., Omission Bias and Pertussis Vaccination, 14
MED. DECISION MAKING 118, 121 (1994) (finding that the omission bias affected survey
participants' decisions whether to vaccinate their children with DPT); Gideon Keren &
Willem A. Wagenaar, On the Psychology of Playing Blackjack: Normative and Descriptive Consider-
ations with Implications for Decision Theory, 114 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 133, 142
(1985) (suggesting regret as a potential explanation for why blackjack players "stand" with
sixteen or less even though the odds are better if they take another card); Dale T. Miller &
Brian R. Taylor, Counterfactual Thought, Regret, and Superstition: How to Avoid Kicking Yourself,
in WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN, supra note 123, at 305, 318 (finding that blackjack players who
answered "yes" to either the question "Do you want a hit?" or "Do you want to stand?" and
then lost, felt worse than players who answered "no" to either question); Ilana Ritov &
Jonathan Baron, Reluctance to Vaccinate: Omission Bias and Ambiguity, 3 J. BEHAV. DECISION
MAKING 263, 275 (1990) [hereinafter Ritov & Baron, Reluctance to Vaccinate] (finding that
"[slubjects are reluctant to vaccinate when the vaccine can cause bad outcomes, even if the
outcomes of not vaccinating are worse," and noting that explanations subjects give for their
decisions are consistent with regret theory); Marcel Zeelenberg et al., Undoing Regret on
Dutch Television: Apologizing for Interpersonal Regrets Involving Actions or Inactions, 24 PERSON-
ALrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1113, 1118 (1998) (finding that in the Dutch Television show
IAm Sony, which offered people the chance to undo their social regrets by apologizing and
offering a bouquet of flowers to the target of their regrets, subjects tended to regret actions
rather than failures to act).
127 Thomas Gilovich & Victoria Husted Medvec, The Experience of Regret: What, When,
and Why, 102 PSYCHOL. REv. 379, 380 (1995). But see Christopher G. Davis et al., The Undo-
ing of Traumatic Life Events, 21 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 109, 115, 120-21 (1995)
(finding that parents of children who died of SIDS and people who had lost close family
members in car accidents regretted omissions and commissions equally).
128 See Janet Landman, Through a Glass Darkly: Worldviews, Counterfactual Thought, and
Emotion, in WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN, supra note 123, at 233, 248 (citing several studies that
have reached this conclusion); Dale T. Miller & Cathy McFarland, Counterfactual Thinking
and Victim Compensation: A Test of Norm Theory, 12 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 513,
516 (1986) (reporting experimental results showing that "victims whose negative fates fol-
low abnormal actions receive more sympathy than victims whose negative fates follow nor-
mal actions").
129 SeeJohn J. Hetts et al., The Influence of Anticipated Counterfactual Regret on Behavior, 17
PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 345, 364 (2000).
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G. Attribution Theory
Why is it that people experience greater regret for bad outcomes
when they result from action (rather than inaction) and abnormal
acts (rather than normal acts)? The answer to this question is impor-
tant for legal actors because it can provide insight into decision mak-
ing by both judges and jurors in a wide range of settings.
Attribution theory provides a framework for investigating this
question. Attribution theory is concerned with how people explain
the world around them,13 and how they assign responsibility, causal-
ity, and blame.'31 Moreover, it provides a more psychological account
of these issues than does the rational man model of law and econom-
ics. 1 3 2 Attribution theory posits that the heightened negative emo-
tions people experience for bad outcomes, which are associated with
actions and abnormalities, is due to the fact that there is a tighter
perceived causal connection between actions and outcomes than be-
tween omissions and outcomes. Similarly, people perceive stronger
causal connections between abnormal behaviors and bad outcomes
than between normal behaviors and bad outcomes. These points are
elaborated below.
130 Dan Coates & Steven Penrod, Social Psychology and the Emergence of Disputes, 15 LAw
& Soc'Y REV. 655, 659 (1980-1981) ("Attribution theory holds that people prefer to find
order and meaning in the world, and usually develop explanations for why events happen
and why people behave as they do."). For some of the foundational works in the field, see
ATTRIBUTION: PERCEIVING THE CAUSES OF BEHAVIOR (Edward E. Jones et al. eds., 1972);
FRITZ HEIDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS (1958); HAROLD H. KELLEY,
CAUSAL SCHEMATA AND THE ATTRIBUTION PROCESS (1972); KELLY G. SHAVER, AN INTRODUC-
TION TO ATTRIBUTION PROCESSES (1975).
131 See Frank D. Fincham &Joseph M. Jaspars, Attribution of Responsibility: From Man the
Scientist to Man as Lawyer, 13 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCI-IOL. 81, 82 (1980) ("In its
broadest conception attribution theory refers to the general process by which the layman
explains events, although traditionally it has been associated with the study of perceived
causality.").
Lawyers who understand attribution theory can use it to influence jurors. Fundamen-
tal attribution error is "the tendency to attribute behavior exclusively to the actor's disposi-
tions and to ignore powerful situational determinants of the behavior." NISBETT & ROSS,
supra note 42, at 31. Joshua Newberg recently explained how the attorneys in the
Microsoft antitrust litigation attempted to induce jurors to commit the fundamental attri-
bution error-to believe that bad results do not just happen, they must be caused by the
actions of people or companies. See Joshua A. Newberg, The Narrative Construction of
Antitrust 39-40 (2002) (unpublished paper, on file with authors).
132 See Donald H. Gerdingen, The Coase Theorem and the Psychology of Common-Law
Thought, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 711, 730 n.90 (1983) (noting that the body of work that makes
up attribution theory "reinforces the idea that commonsense or intuitionistic thinking has
structures that often run counter to formalistic methods of analysis usually associated with
'rational' or 'scientific' thought such as statistical analysis").
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1. Attribution Theoy and the Omission Bias
Attribution theory teaches that people organize their thoughts
about the physical and social world in terms of causal relationships. 33
Particularly important in this process is determining to what cause or
set of causes particular effects can be attributed.13 4 The causal
schemas we generate are often simpler than the network of causal
forces that actually operate to produce such complex negative effects
as financial, emotional, or physical harm. For example, people rarely
think about the role that chance plays in producing poor patient re-
sponses to chemotherapy, focusing instead on tangible, precipitating
events such as treatment dose, treatment timing, and administration
of the drug. This focus on tangible precipitating acts is important for
our purposes, because it suggests that people are more likely to per-
ceive causal properties in actions -than inactions.
Returning to our previous example involving Milo's drowning,
most people will agree that Sally is a greater cause of Milo's accident
when she actively bumps into him than when she is passively bumped
by him. To the extent Sally is perceived to be a causal agent, she is
likely to be held more responsible and more blameworthy for Milo's
injuries. 135 Perceived intentionality may act as a mediating variable
between causality and responsibility. That is, people may regard ac-
tors to be more responsible for harm than nonactors because actors'
behavior seems more intentional. 136 Although the actors themselves
133 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Causal Schemas in Judgments Under Uncer-
tainty, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTI, supra note 4, at 117, 117 ("It is a psychological
commonplace that people strive to achieve a coherent interpretation of the events that
surround them, and that the organization of events by schemas of cause-effect relations
serves to achieve this goal.").
134 Ross & Anderson, supra note 92, at 130 (noting that as people attempt to under-
stand the causes and implications of the events they witness, they must first identify causes
of particular effects and then draw inferences about the attributes or dispositions of the
relevant actors).
135 SeeJonathan Haidt &Jonathan Baron, Social Roles and the MoralJudgement of Acts and
Omissions, 26 EUR. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 201, 215-16 (1996); Ritov & Baron, Outcome Knowledge,
supra note 126, at 119; see also Fincham &Jaspars, supra note 131, at 125 ("[Tlhe common-
sense notion that judgments of causation partly determine those of responsibility, which in
turn affect judgments of blame and punishment, implicitly informs much of this [social
psychological] research.").
Whereas there is evidence that people will view an actor's actions as more blamewor-
thy if they are more closely connected causally with a victim's injuries, there is also evi-
dence that people will view an actor's actions as more causal if they are more blameworthy.
See Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Causation, 63J. PERSONALrIv & SOC. PSYCHOL. 368, 376 (1992)
(reporting results of four studies indicating "that the degree of culpability in an act can
influence perceptions of causation").
136 SeeJohanna H. Kordes-de Vaal, Intention and the Omission Bias: Omissions Perceived as
Nondecisions, 93 ACTA PSvCHOLOGICA 161, 169 (1996) ("Because of the reduced strength of
the perceived causal link between an omission and its consequence, an omission may usu-
ally be perceived as a nondecision, or at least as a less intended decision than a
commission.").
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may vehemently reject the notion of intentionality in cases in which
harm results, they may still feel greater responsibility for their actions
than their omissions, which leads to greater self-blame and regret for
actions than for omissions when both produce bad results. 137
The notion that omissions are less causally connected to out-
comes than actions, and that therefore those who sin by omission are
less culpable than those who sin by actions, has broad implications for
the law. It suggests that those who wish to minimize their own respon-
sibility for subsequent bad outcomes may wish to think twice about
taking action when similar results can be obtained through more pas-
sive involvement. For example, physicians who fail to protect their
patients may be seen as less negligent than those who try to protect
and fail. Some evidence supports this view. In one study, people
found active euthanasia more blameworthy than passive euthanasia,
even in situations that were comparable in terms of the physician's
motive (to minimize patient suffering) and the end result (the pa-
tient's death).13 8 Other studies show that the omission bias may affect
jury compensation decisions. Mockjurors tend to award greater dam-
ages and impose greater penalties when injuries result from acts
rather than omissions, even when other relevant factors are held
constant. -39
137 See Julie Feldman et al., Are Actions Regretted More than Inactions?, 78 ORGANIZA-
TIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 232, 234 (1999) (noting that "in cases where
the same outcome results from an action or an inaction, actions are regretted more in-
tensely than inactions"); Gilovich & Medvec, supra note 123, at 264-65 ("Individuals are
thought to 'own' their actions more than their inactions, and so an action that leads to
negative consequences is considered more likely to induce a disquieting sense of 'This did
not have to be' or 'I brought this on myself.'"); Haidt & Baron, supra note 135, at 205, 215
(hypothesizing and finding in a series of empirical studies that "[w]hen a distinction is
made between omissions and acts, harmful acts will be judged more immoral than other-
wise equivalent omissions"); Barton L. Ingraham, The Right of Silence, the Presumption of Inno-
cence, the Burden of Proof and a Modest Proposal: A Reply to O'Reilly, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOCY 559, 581 n.55 (1996) ("Attribution theory suggests that . . . the normal
human reaction is to feel that the person who failed in his duty to prevent the harm from
occurring is . . . less blameworthy than if he had produced the harm alone by active mis-
conduct."); Ritov & Baron, Reluctance to Vaccinate, supra note 126, at 275 ("One is perceived
to be more responsible for outcomes of commissions than for outcomes of omissions.");
Mark Spranca et al., Omission and Commission in Judgment and Choice, 27 J. EXPERIMENrAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 76, 84-85 (1991) (finding that people view actions resulting in bad conse-
quences as more immoral than inactions resulting in similar consequences).
138 See David B. Sugarman, Active Versus Passive Euthanasia: An Attributional Analysis, 16
J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 60, 70-71 (1986) (reporting that in a study the "physician in the
active euthanasia condition was attributed greater responsibility for the patient's death and
was evaluated more negatively than the physician in the passive euthanasia conditions" and
that "an act of active euthanasia was perceived as being less in line with perceived medical
standards than passive euthanasia").
1 9 See Baron & Ritov, supra note 5, at 17 (finding that victims tend to "receive less
compensation for injuries caused by omissions or by nature than for injuries caused by
acts"); Ritov & Baron, Judgements of Compensation, supra note 74, at 537-38 (finding similar
results in a civil damages action).
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2. Attribution Theory and the Normality Bias
In our quest to understand why bad outcomes sometimes occur,
attribution theorists140 and legal philosophers1 41 have suggested that
unusual acts and circumstances stand out as causal candidates over
more usual ones. Abnormalities are not merely perceived to be more
causal, they also cause greater regret and receive greater blame. One
study showed that people presume that drivers who are involved in an
accident after taking an unusual route to work will suffer more regret
than those drivers who are involved in an identically bad accident
when taking a more usual route home. 142 Another study showed that
if a person is mugged on his way home, jurors will feel sorrier for him,
view the muggers as more responsible, and impose a higher punish-
ment if they are told that the person took an abnormal route home. 43
Similarly, Professors Miller and McFarland found that mock jurors
awarded higher compensation to robbery victims when they were told
that the robbery occurred in a store that the victim visited
infrequently. 144
A study by Professor Richard Wiener and his colleagues showed
that this normality bias (that is, a bias against the abnormal) is so
strong that it may influence how jurors interpret the meaning of guid-
ing legal principles.145 In their study, mock jurors were asked to make
negligence judgments initially by comparing defendants' actions to
those of a "careful and prudent person." 146 The subjects were then
asked to reconsider the normality of the defendant's actions. In-
creases in the mock jurors' perceptions of the normality of the defen-
dant's actions were closely associated with conclusions that the
defendant had met or surpassed the legal standard of care and there-
fore was not negligent.' 47 Further, the more normal the mock jurors
140 See, e.g., Denis J. Hilton & Ben R. Slugoski, Knowledge-Based Causal Attribution: The
Abnormal Conditions Focus Model, 93 PSYCHOL. REv. 75, 87 (1986) (noting that abnormal
conditions come to be dignified as the cause of an event because they are the necessary
conditions for the occurrence of a target event that contrast with the conditions obtained
in a comparison case in which the target event did not occur); C. Gustav Lundberg & Dean
Elliot Frost, Counterfactuals in Financial Decision Making, 79 AcrA PSYCHOLOGICA 227, 227-28
(1992) (surveying the literature and noting that event abnormality can play an important
role in causal attribution).
141 See, e.g., HART & HONOR9, supra note 46, at 41 (noting that it is often the "abnormal
occurrence" that is recognized as "making the difference" in causal attributions).
142 See Kahneman & Miller, supra note 51, at 145.
143 See Macrae et al., supra note 11, at 224-25.
144 See Miller & McFarland, supra note 128, at 515-16.
145 See Wiener et al., supra note 7.
146 Id. at 94.
147 Id. at 97.
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viewed the defendant's behavior, the more confident they were in
their verdicts. 148
H. Counterfactual Thinking
In the subpart above, we introduced attribution theory and de-
scribed how it can help us understand why legal decision makers feel
more strongly about bad outcomes when those outcomes result from
abnormal, active deeds as opposed to normal, passive deeds. We sug-
gested that the causal bonds between precipitating events and out-
comes are strongest when those precipitating events involve action or
are viewed as abnormal. We further suggested that the strength of
these bonds affects how legal decision makers think about responsibil-
ity and blame for bad outcomes that have occurred. These observa-
tions followed from the psychological framework that attribution
theory offers.
Borrowing from Kahneman and Miller's norm theory, 149 we now
offer a psychological mechanism that may underlie many of the phe-
nomena (e.g., status quo bias, endowment effect, loss aversion, sunk
cost effects, omission bias, and normality bias) and theories (e.g., re-
gret theory and attribution theory) that we have examined to this
point. A rich cognitive literature points to counterfactual thinking as
the lynchpin. Counterfactual thinking is what occurs when we imag-
ine states of the world that might have occurred but did not. 5 0 Collo-
quially speaking, counterfactual thinking is best understood as "if
only" thinking: "If only he had not stopped at the convenience store
that night, he would not have been robbed." The comparison be-
tween what happened and what might have happened is the defining
feature of the counterfactual.15 1
Counterfactuals play a central role in how people determine cau-
sation, 152 including causation of the "but for" variety. According to
the simulation heuristic, people judge the strength of a connection
148 id.; see also Richard L. Wiener, Social Analytic Jurisprudence and Tort Law: Social Cogni-
tion Goes to Court, 37 ST. Louis U. L.J. 503, 541 (1993) (discussing the implications of this
study and other similar findings for tort decisions).
149 Kahneman & Miller, supra note 51.
15o See Vittorio Girotto et al., Event Controllability in Counterfactual Thinking, 78 ACTA
PSYCi-ioLoolcA 111, 112 (1991) (defining counterfactual thinking as "the mental construc-
tion of alternatives to factual events").
151 See C. Neil Macrae, A Tale of Two Curries: Counteifactual Thinking and Accident-Related
Judgments, 18 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHIOL. BULL. 84, 84 (1992) ("[O]ur interpretation of
reality is often a relativistic process whereby we compare event outcomes with postcom-
puted or counterfactual alternatives.").
152 See Adam D. Galinsky & Gordon B. Moskowitz, Counterfactuals as Behavioral Primes:
Priming the Simulation Heuristic and Consideration of Alternatives, 36 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 384, 385 (2000) (noting that "judgments of causality are often driven by not only
what actually happened, but also what almost happened or what normally happens").
[Vol. 88:583
2003] A NORMALITY BIAS IN LEGAL DECISION MAKING
between an effect and a proposed cause by engaging in a thought
simulation or experiment in which the proposed cause is "undone."'153
If undoing the proposed cause produces a simulated outcome that is
different from that which occurred, then people will tend to accept its
role as a causal agent. 154 Therefore, a causal relationship is more
likely to be perceived between proposed causes and outcomes when
the outcomes are highly mutable. 155 Thus, in Miller and McFarland's
robbery example, 156 because it is relatively easy to imagine a different
outcome (i.e., no robbery), and because a mental elimination of the
proposed cause (i.e., stopping at the convenience store) would seem
to produce a different outcome, people are likely to perceive a causal
link between the victim's behavior and the negative outcome if they
think counterfactually. On the other hand, counterfactual thinking
would not support a causal link between failing to carry an umbrella
and a rainstorm, because the rainstorm is an immutable event.
In the legal arena, outcomes are generally immutable, and
counterfactual simulations aid fact finders in identifying "but for"
causal factors. Empirical research suggests that these phenomena
have implications for how jurors assign responsibility, blame, and pun-
ishment.1 57 Nyla Branscombe and her colleagues found that the
amount of blame mock jurors assigned to a particular party in hypo-
thetical civil and criminal cases depended, in large part, on whether
the jurors were encouraged to generate counterfactuals involving that
party.158 The researchers concluded that "presentation of an if-only
counterfactual focusing on the opposing counsel's client can lower
blame to one's own client. Likewise, presenting a counterfactual of
the 'even if my client had done otherwise' sort can lower blame to
one's own client by implicating the other party."'1 5 9
1. Counterfactual Thinking and the Omission Bias
One reason actors are more likely to be blamed for bad outcomes
than nonactors is the ease of conjuring up counterfactuals. 60 It is
easier to imagine George not taking an action ("If only he hadn't pur-
153 See Kahneman & Tversky, Simulation Heuristic, supra note 110.
154 See Gary L. Wells & Igor Gavanski, Mental Simulation of Causality, 56 J. PERSONALITY
& Soc. PSYCHOL. 161, 161 (1989).
155 See id. at 161-62.
156 See Miller & McFarland, supra note 128, at 514-16.
157 See Wells & Gavanski, supra note 154, at 167 (reporting that counterfactual thinking
had "almost identical" effects on judgments of causality and judgments of responsibility).
158 See Branscombe et al., supra note 56, at 1061-64.
159 Id. at 1063.
160 See Landman, supra note 128, at 249 ("Apparently people find it easier to imagine
inaction as an alternative to action than to imagine action alternatives to inaction."); Miller
& Taylor, supra note 126, at 321 ("Ill-fated acts of commission evoke counterfactual alterna-
tives and, hence, regret more strongly than do ill-fated acts of omission.").
617
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
chased that stock") than to imagine Paul taking an action that he did
not take ("If only he had purchased that stock").' 6 1 When we men-
tally undo an action that was taken, we are, in a sense, restoring a
more natural or normal state. Prior to the stock purchase, George did
not own the stock and so it is easy to imagine him in that state once
again. The same is not true of the counterfactual in which we try to
imagine Paul purchasing a stock that he never owned. Ownership is
not a previous state for Paul and so it is a less natural and less compel-
ling counterfactual to contemplate.
In the civil courtroom, the psychology of counterfactual thinking
ordinarily confers an advantage on plaintiffs because their attorneys
often try to persuade jurors that a defendant's actions were inextrica-
bly linked to some greater responsibility, regret, blame, and punish-
ment. In contrast, a jury may find a plaintiffs failures to act less
objectionable, in part because "if only" counterfactuals are less persua-
sive when they describe a state that never existed. 62
The potential effect of counterfactual thinking on decision mak-
ing is also highlighted by a phenomenon called "inaction inertia," a
label for the tendency people have to pass up attractive action oppor-
tunities after they have passed up an even more attractive opportunity
at an earlier time.' 63 For example, if a person is presented with an
61 Kalhneman & Tversky, supra note 8, at 173.
162 See Ruth Beyth-Marom et al., Perceived Consequences of Risky Behaviors: Adults and Ado-
lescents, 29 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 549, 560 (1993) ("[]t is easier to think about action
than about inaction, which is often less well defined. As a result, inaction provides a
poorer (cognitive) starting point for generating possibilities."); Faith Gleicher et al., The
Role of Counterfactual Thinking in Judgments of Affect, 16 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BuLL.
284, 291 (1990) (finding that individuals who lost money on the basis of action were
judged as feeling worse than those who lost money on the basis of inaction); Hetts et al.,
supra note 129, at 348 (noting that "research has suggested that counterfactual generation
is easier following actions than inactions"); Kahneman & Miller, supra note 51, at 145 (not-
ing that "it is usually easier to imagine oneself abstaining from actions that one has carried
out than carrying out actions that were not in fact performed").
An experiment by Patrizia Catellani and Patrizia Milesi also supports the claim that
actions lend themselves to counterfactual thinking more than inactions, but with two quali-
fications. See Patrizia Catellani & Patrizia Milesi, Counterfactuals and Roles: Mock Victims' and
Perpetrators' Accounts of Judicial Cases, 31 EUR. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 247, 261 (2001). First, the
action-inaction effect is influenced by role-based motivations. Id. For example, those who
were assigned a passive role (victim in a crime) expressed more alternatives to the perpe-
trators' controllable actions than to their own; in contrast, those assigned the role of perpe-
trator did not mutate the victim's controllable actions more than their own. Id. Second,
counterfactual thinking is shaped by socially shared expectations regarding peoples' ac-
tions. Id. For example, because a perpetrator of a crime is expected to be more active
than a crime victim, observers are particularly likely to mutate the perpetrator's actions
and the victim's inactions. See id. at 261-62.
163 See Orit E. Tykocinski & Thane S. Pittman, The Consequences of Doing Nothing: Inac-
tion Inertia as Avoidance of Anticipated Counterfactual Regret, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SoC.
PSYCHOL. 607, 615-16 (1998) [hereinafter Tykocinski & Pittman, Consequences] (providing
substantial evidence that anticipated counterfactual regret is a major cause of inaction in-
ertia); Orit E. Tykocinski et al., Inaction Intertia: Foregoing Future Benefits as a Result of an
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opportunity to join a frequent flier club and accumulate 5,000 miles
for an upcoming flight, she is likely to accept the opportunity if it is
her first opportunity to join the club. However, she is less likely to
join the club if she had forgone an earlier opportunity to earn 7,500
miles, and even less likely if she had forgone an earlier opportunity to
earn 15,000 miles.' 64 The most likely source of this inaction inertia is
a desire to avoid the regret of being reminded that she had passed up
an earlier, better opportunity. 16 5
2. Counterfactual Thinking and the Normality Bias
Just as it is easier to generate counterfactuals for actions than
inactions, it is also easier to generate counterfactuals for abnormal
events than normal events. 1 66 The mental mutation of abnormal
events is relatively straightforward because the post-mutation outcome
is a normal or usual state that fits well within the natural social order.
For the man who is car-jacked while taking an unusual route home
from work, it is not hard to imagine what might have happened if only
he had taken his usual route. He can easily imagine this option be-
cause it is one that he has taken many times before. He knows that his
usual route is a safe one. In contrast, for the man who is car-jacked
while taking his usual route home, it is unnatural for him to imagine
what might have happened if only he had taken an unfamiliar route.
It is equally unnatural for those observing or judging the actor to see
strong links between normal behavior and subsequent bad
outcomes. 
1 6 7
Initial Failure to Act, 68J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 793, 801-02 (1995) (reporting sev-
eral experiments showing inaction inertia); Orit E. Tykocinski & Thane S. Pittman, Product
Aversion Following a Missed Opportunity: Price Contrast or Avoidance of Anticipated Regret?, 23
BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 149, 155-56 (2001) [hereinafter Tykocinski & Pittman,
Product Aversion] (reporting the results of three experiments showing that avoidance-of-
regret is the most likely explanation for inaction inertia)
164 See Tykocinski et al., supra note 163, at 801-02.
165 SeeTykocinski & Pittman, Consequences, supra note 163, at 615-16. Though empiri-
cally untested, we suspect that inaction inertia causes parties in civil cases to be less likely to
accept an attractive mid-trial settlement offer when they have rejected an earlier, more
attractive, offer.
166 See Lundberg & Frost, supra note 140, at 233, 240 (finding equivocal empirical sup-
port for the notion that exceptions to the routine "evoke contrasting normal alternatives,
but not vice versa, and that "an unanticipated event is more likely to be undone by altering
exceptional rather than routine aspects of the causal chain"); Macrae, supra note 151, at 84
("[lI]t is simpler to generate counterfactual alternatives for abnormal (e.g., exceptional)
than for normal (e.g., routine) actions."); Gary L. Wells et al., The Undoing of Scenarios, 53J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 421, 428 (1987) (finding support for the "assertion that ex-
ceptional events are more psychologically mutable than are normal events"); Wiener et al.,
supra note 7, at 91 ("Research in counterfactual thinking has shown that it is easier to
mentally mutate exceptional or unusual events.").
167 See Barbara A. Spellman & David R. Mandel, When Possibility Informs Reality:
Counterfactual Thinking as a Cue to Causality, 8 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. Scl. 120,
121 (1999) (noting that bad outcomes and abnormal events are the most likely triggers of
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Empirical studies indicate that such a normality bias, which has its
roots in the relative ease with which counterfactuals are generated for
abnormal behaviors, operates across a broad set of tasks related to
both empirical and cognitive judgments. Miller and McFarland, for
example, found that when people were victimized by abnormal events,
others' emotional reactions were intensified by counterfactual
thoughts. More specifically, they felt greater sympathy toward the vic-
tims and therefore were willing to award them higher
compensation. 168
While Miller and McFarland investigated judgments regarding
the victim, others have examined judgments regarding the perpetra-
tor. For example, Kandi Turley and colleagues found that when a
rape victim takes an unusual route home, mock jurors impose stiffer
prison sentences on the rapist.' 69 Similarly, C. Neil Macrae demon-
strated that the availability of counterfactual alternatives for an acci-
dent preceded by exceptional circumstances led mock jurors to judge
the accident perpetrator to be more negligent and more deserving of
a large fine. 170 Macrae and colleagues then extended this research in
a study that asked mock jurors to assume that a criminal burgled a
house while the owners were away on a three-month vacation. 17 1
Some subjects were presented with a scenario in which the burglary
occurred in the middle of the three-month period, while other sub-
jects were told that the burglary occurred the night before the family
was due to return home. 172 Although there is no legal or economic
reason for concluding that it is worse to commit a burglary the night
before the family returns home than some night in the middle of the
vacation, from a psychological perspective, the timing of the crime
matters. When the burglary occurs just before the family returns, a
compelling counterfactual presents itself: "If only the family had come
home one day earlier, this would not have happened." This
counterfactual, in turn, is likely to produce more sympathy for the
victims and greater punishment for the perpetrator. In fact, Macrae
and colleagues found that mock jurors believed the night-before bur-
counterfactual musings in causality determinations); see also Karl Christoph Klauer et al.,
Counterfactual Processing: Test of an Hierarchical Correspondence Model, 25 EURO. J. Soc.
PSYCHOL. 577, 589 (1995) (finding that subjects' mental simulations were "guided by ...
causal information and by correspondence in terms of normality").
168 Miller & McFarland, supra note 128, at 515-16; see also Robert K. Bothwell & Kermit
W. Duhon, Counterfactual Thinking and Plaintiff Compensation, 134J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 705, 706
(1994) (finding a significant relationship between counterfactual thinking and plaintiff
compensation, but not always in a direction favoring the plaintiff).
169 Kandi Jo Turley et al., Counterfactual Thinking and Perceptions of Rape, 17 BASIC &
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 285, 289-90 (1995).
170 Macrae, Tale of Two Curries, supra note 151, at 86.
171 Macrae et al., supra note 11, at 223.
172 Id.
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glary to be more blameworthy and more deserving of severe punish-
ment than a burglary that occurred in the middle of the vacation, and
exhibited more sympathy toward the victims.'
7 3
III
Two EMPIRICAL STUDIES: THE EFFECTS OF ACTION AND
ABNORMALITY ON NEGLIGENCE JUDGMENTS
Because actions rather than omissions tend to produce abnormal
states, it is hard to know whether people's relative sensitivity to harms
that follow actions is due to an omission bias or a normality bias. No
research has examined this particular question, although there is evi-
dence that both the status quo bias (a close cousin of the normality
bias) 174 and the omission bias affect decision makers when both are
present.175 Even less clear is which bias-the omission bias or the nor-
mality bias-exerts a stronger impact on legal decision makers when
they run in opposite directions. For example, which bias will prevail
in situations in which inaction preserves an abnormal state and action
produces a more normal state? Will legal decision makers seek
greater punishment for an individual whose actions bring about a
harm, or for an individual whose inactions maintain an abnormal
state in which the identical harm occurs? We performed two experi-
ments to provide insight into this question.
A. The Medical Malpractice Experiment
1. Actions and Counterfactuals
As noted earlier, several researchers have argued that actions are
more likely than inactions to produce regret when bad outcomes oc-
cur because actions appear to be more abnormal.176 Actions seem ab-
173 Id. Macrae and colleagues also found that mock jurors punished more severely a
defendant who mugged a person who took an unusual route home from a bar than a
defendant who mugged a person who took his normal route home. Id. at 224.
Ritov and Baron conducted a related study in which train passengers were injured
when the train hit a tree lying across the railroad tracks. Ritov & Baron, Judgements of
Compensation, supra note 74, at 528. In some versions, the engineer decided not to stop the
train or tried in vain to stop the train. Id. at 529. In another version, an automatic stop-
ping device successfully stopped the train but passengers were injured by the suddenness
of the stop. Id. In yet another version, the train did not stop because an automatic stop-
ping device failed. Id. The researchers found that jurors' compensation judgments were
positively associated with scenario abnormality-" [i]f the injury occurred as a result of ex-
ception to the routine, subjects awarded higher compensation." Id. at 537.
174 See supra Part II.A.
175 See Maurice Schweitzer, Disentangling Status Quo and Omission Effects: An Experimental
Analysis, 58 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 457, 470-72 (1994) (find-
ing that the effects of the status quo bias and the omission bias are additive); Marcel
Zeelenberg et al., Reconsidering the Relation, supra note 119, at 268 (finding similar evidence
of additivity).
176 See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
normal because they are easy to undo or mentally erase. 77 Inactions
are not as easily undone, and thus do not seem to be abnormal.1 78
Thus, one might predict that negligence that occurs when a physician
intervenes in a patient's treatment and causes harm (active negli-
gence) would be viewed as worse than negligence that occurs when a
physician fails to intervene and an identical harm befalls the patient
(passive negligence). 79 If this prediction is true, then we would ex-
pect larger damages awards in cases of active negligence than in cases
of passive negligence, even when the resultant harm to the patient is
identical in the two types of cases.
2. Abnormality of Conduct
If people do regard active negligence to be worse than passive
negligence, as some studies have shown,18 1s then it is not necessarily
true that the active/passive variable is responsible for this difference.
Active negligence may be regarded as worse than passive negligence
either because the acts are conducive to counterfactuals (which, in
turn, leads to negative emotions such as regret), or because the acts
are believed to be unconventional. Therefore, the unanswered empir-
ical question is: If people find active negligence to be more reprehen-
sible than passive negligence, is this judgment driven more by the fact
that an action (as opposed to an omission) was the precipitating fac-
tor, or by the fact that the specific action taken was unconventional?
That is, suppose that an act of active negligence was actually normal,
or that an act of passive negligence was actually abnormal. Which will
jurors punish more? Will the defendant's level of participation (pas-
sive, active) predict damages, or will the degree of abnormality in
treatment (conventional, unconventional) be a better predictor?
The answers to these questions have important implications both
for the theoretical question of how people determine responsibility,
blame, and punishment, and for the practical question of when jurors
are more likely to side with a plaintiff. We therefore conducted two
controlled, scientific experiments to tease apart the effects of active-
ness and abnormality on when and how people judge allegedly negli-
gent. conduct.
177 See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
178 See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
179 A standard definition of active negligence is "[n]egligence resulting from an af-
firmative or positive act, such as driving through a barrier." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1056
(7th ed. 1999). Passive negligence is defined as "[niegligence resulting from a person's
failure or omission in acting, such as failing to remove hazardous conditions from public
property." Id. at 1057.
180 See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
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3. Details of the Case
The legal context for our first experiment was a medical malprac-
tice action. We chose this context because it is one in which issues of
active harm, unconventional treatment, negligence, and compensa-
tion play a key role at trial. We presented 211 mock jurors 81 with
written case materials in which an experienced physician who special-
ized in the treatment of colon cancer was sued for malpractice by the
family of a patient who died while under the doctor's care.1 8 2
In this case, the doctor decided to treat a female cancer patient
with either a conventional or an unconventional protocol. Further-
more, based on an examination of the patient's recent test results, the
doctor switched the patient's treatment protocol (active), or did not
switch the patient's protocol (passive). In this manner, four versions
of the case were created, as shown in Table 1.
TABLE 1
FOUR VERSIONS OF THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE
Treatment
Conventional Unconventional
U Active Version 1 Version 2Q)
Z Passive Version 3 Version 4
The following facts appeared in all four versions of the case: (1) the
patient died; (2) three credible experts testified that the patient
would have had a normal, cancer-free life if the physician had chosen
the other treatment regime; and (3) the defense argued that none of
the experts could be certain about what outcome would have oc-
curred if the physician had treated the patient differently.
4. Questions for the Jurors
After studying the case, jurors were provided with instructions
that were modeled after those commonly used in medical malpractice
cases. 8 3 Next, jurors were asked whether the physician was negligent
181 The mock jurors were full-time students enrolled in classes at the University of
Texas at Austin. Forty-nine percent of the participants were female and all were eligible
for jury service in that they were U.S. citizens, at least eighteen-years-old, and had not been
convicted of a felony. Jury eligibility was self-reported. See infta Appendix A, Question 16.
182 A complete description of one version of the case and the questions that we asked
the jurors appear in Appendix A.
183 See infra Appendix A.
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and, if so, what sum of money should be awarded to the plaintiff. 18 4
These liability and compensation questions were key. If the mere act
of switching treatments invites counterfactual reasoning that makes
the jurors feel badly about the treatment, then we would expect to see
more verdicts for the plaintiff and higher damages awards among ju-
rors in the active groups. This pattern of data should appear irrespec-
tive of whether the treatment regime that the physician implemented
was conventional or unconventional. However, if perceptions of ab-
normality are closely tied to the conventional or unconventional na-
ture of the treatment, then we would expect to see more verdicts for
the plaintiff and higher damages awards among jurors in the uncon-
ventional groups. Of course, it may be that awards are influenced by
both the activeness of the negligence and the unconventionality of the
treatment. The design of this study also allows us to test this
possibility.
After answering the first two questions, jurors answered questions
about whether the physician (1) caused the patient's death, (2) de-
served substantial blame for the outcome, and (3) incurred a heavy
moral responsibility for the patient's death. 18 5 The purpose of these
questions was to determine whether there is a link between the mone-
tary judgments that jurors in the different groups provide and the
jurors' beliefs about causality, blameworthiness, and moral responsi-
bility. We predicted that groups which gave higher damages awards
would be more likely to link the physician's behavior to the patient's
death, and more likely to find that the physician deserves more blame
and responsibility for the outcome than those groups that gave lower
damages awards.
Next, jurors answered seven questions related to negative emo-
tional reactions that they might feel when thinking about the case. 186
Six of the reactions we considered-anger, resentment, anxiety, fear,
sadness, and disgust-are well-established constructs in the psychol-
ogy of negative emotions.' 87 We also inquired about the degree to
which jurors felt betrayed by the physician. Consistent with our pre-
dictions above, we anticipated stronger negative emotions from jurors
in the groups that give larger awards.
Next, jurors indicated whether they believed that the State Medi-
cal Society should suspend the physician's license. 8 8 The purpose of
this question was to determine whether and when jurors desire to
184 See infra Appendix A, Questions 1-2.
185 See infra Appendix A, Questions 3-5.
186 See infra Appendix A, Questions 6-12.
187 SeeRICHARD S. LAZARUS, EMOTION AND ADAPTATION 67, 82 (1991) (categorizing neg-
ative emotions).
188 See infra Appendix A, Question 13.
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punish the defendant-physician in ways that do not benefit the
plaintiff.
Finally, jurors indicated whether the physician's treatment deci-
sion was abnormal.'l 9 This question served as a check on our assump-
tion that jurors would consider the unconventional treatment
protocol to be abnormal and the conventional treatment protocol to
be normal.
After completing the four-page experimental questionnaire indi-
vidually, the jurors within each group were divided at random into
three- to six-person juries. Each jury discussed and deliberated about
the case for twenty minutes or until the jurors reached unanimous
agreement on the first two questions (liability and compensation),
whichever came first.190 Sixty-five juries produced usable responses
for both the liability and compensation questions.19'
5. Results and Discussion
a. Assumption Check
As expected, individual jurors did find the unconventional treat-
ment protocol to be significantly more abnormal than the conven-
tional treatment protocol. 192
b. Active/Passive Does Not Matter
The results showed that jurors did not treat deaths that resulted
from the physician's active deed (i.e., switching the patient's medica-
tion regime) any differently than deaths that resulted from the physi-
cian's passive deed (i.e., maintaining the patient's medication
regime). Nearly identical proportions of individual jurors in the ac-
tive and passive harm groups judged the physician's conduct to be
negligent (58% vs. 56% respectively, which is not statistically signifi-
cant). Among jurors who thought the physician owed damage money
to the plaintiff, the size of the damages awards was unaffected by
whether the physicians actively or passively caused the harm (average
awards were $1.9 million vs. $1.7 million respectively, which is not sta-
189 See infra Appendix A, Question 14.
190 The juries were provided with the following written instruction: "Please deliberate
as a group until you have reached unanimous agreement on questions 1 and 2 below."
The jurors then received the same instructions that they received as individual jurors. The
juries answered the first two questionA only.
191 In addition, there were ten hung juries and several juries that provided uncodable
responses. These data were excluded from the analyses.
192 p < .001. When a statistical test yields a p value < .05, the test is statistically signifi-
cant. In the statistical tests we report, the p value refers to the probability that the different
mean responses observed across the groups of jurors who read different versions of the
case could have arisen by chance alone. The statistical tests that we used included t-tests,
chi-square tests, analyses of variance, and loglinear techniques.
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tistically significant). The data for deliberating juries were similar.
For example, similar proportions of juries in the active and passive
behavior groups returned judgments for the plaintiff (62% vs. 68%
respectively, which is not statistically significant). 9-
This pattern of results persisted on the secondary questions as
well. Indeed, there were no statistically significant differences be-
tween the active and passive behavior groups on any of the fourteen
secondary questions that the jurors answered.
c. Normal/Abnormal Matters
In stark contrast to the results for the active/passive variable, the
results for the normal/abnormal variable yielded significant differ-
ences on the key questions. As Figure 1 shows, individual jurors were
more likely to find the physician negligent when he provided an ab-
normal (unconventional) treatment than when he provided a normal
(conventional) treatment in both the active (68% vs. 48%) and the
passive (62% vs. 50%) behavior conditions.1 94 The results for the ju-
ries were similar: juries were more likely to return a judgment for the
plaintiff when the treatment was unconventional than when it was
conventional (76% vs. 50% respectively, which is statistically signifi-
cant). 195 Jurors in the unconventional treatment group were also sig-
nificantly more likely than jurors in the conventional treatment group
to agree that the State Medical Society should impose the maximum
(one-year) license suspension against the physician. 196
These results show that people seek greater punishment of a phy-
sician who causes harm when the harm results from unconventional
treatment rather than conventional treatment. For a possible expla-
nation, we turn to jurors' responses to the responsibility questions197
and the negative emotional response questions. 198 With respect to the
responsibility questions, we found that jurors in the unconventional
treatment group were more likely than jurors in the conventional
treatment group to agree with the statements that the physician (1)
caused the patient's death,199 (2) deserves substantial blame for the pa-
tient's death, 200 and (3) bears a heavy moral responsibility for the pa-
tient's death. 20 With respect to the negative emotion questions,
193 As an aside, we noticed that juries were slightly more inclined to judge the physi-
cian's conduct to be negligent than individual jurors.
194 p < .01
195 p < .04
196 p < .02.
197 See infra Appendix A, Questions 3-5.
198 See infra Appendix A, Questions 6-12.
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FIGURE 1
THE EFFECTS OF TREATMENT ABNORMALITY AND TYPE OF DECISION ON
MALPRACTICE VERDICTS: INDIVIDUAL JURORS











Type of Decision by Physician
however, we did not find any differences between jurors in the various
groups on any of the seven questions. Only a small proportion of ju-
rors reported strong negative emotions. This finding suggests that ju-
rors' responses to these cases are better explained as cognitive rather
than affective effects, although teasing these effects apart is never
easy. 202
d. Discussion
In our Medical Malpractice experiment, the effects of the nor-
mality bias swamped those of the omission bias. In other words, jurors
did not focus on whether the harm resulted from the defendant's ac-
tions or omissions, but rather on whether the defendant's conduct led
to an abnormal end-state. It is apparent that it is not the activeness of
behaviors per se that makes them more punishment-worthy when bad
outcomes arise, but rather their abnormality. We disentangled the ef-
fects of activeness from abnormality and found that the former had
little impact on perceived responsibility or the desire to punish. A
doctor who actively switches to a fatal treatment regime is less likely to
202 James A. Shepperd et al., Abandoning Unrealistic Optimism: Performance Estimates and
the Temporal Proximity of Self-Relevant Feedback, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 844, 853
(1996) ("Teasing apart cognitive and motivational explanations for apparently self-serving
behavior is notoriously difficult ....").
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be deemed responsible ifjurors believe that the treatment was a nor-
mal one. However, a doctor who provides an unconventional treat-
ment cannot escape the abnormality of his decision regardless of
whether his conduct was active or passive. On a broader level, these
results suggest that blame and punishment are closely linked to per-
ceptions of abnormality. Those who violate norms (either through
action or inaction) incur greater responsibility for subsequent out-
comes than those who tread along well-established paths.
We caution that our results do not suggest that the omission bias
is unimportant. As discussed earlier, strong evidence exists that peo-
ple are more positively disposed toward inaction than action. 2°3 How-
ever, most of these omission bias studies did not hold the normality
variable constant when measuring the effects of omission and commis-
sion on judgment. For example, in Sugarman's study of active versus
passive euthanasia, subjects evaluated more negatively and attributed
greater responsibility to physicians who engaged in active euthanasia
than those who engaged in passive euthanasia.20 4 It is important that
the study was conducted in the United States, where active euthanasia
is likely to be viewed as abnormal. If the study were conducted in a
society where active euthanasia was the norm, it might produce a dif-
ferent result.
B. The Stock Loss Experiment
In the classic study of regret and the omission bias described
above, tm Paul and George have stock portfolios. Paul switches out of
a well performing stock into a poorly performing stock and George
stays in the poorly performing stock after considering a switch to the
well performing stock. The study's results indicate an omission bias-
Paul, the active switcher, regrets his move more than George regrets
his failure to move. However, this experiment did not manipulate
normality. Because an act of commission such as switching one's
stock portfolio is probably regarded as more abnormal than an act of
omission such as leaving one's portfolio alone, perhaps the perceived
abnormality lies behind the observed omission bias. But what if we
expressly manipulate the normality or abnormality of the stocks that
Paul and George hold? When we introduced such a variable in our
Medical Malpractice study, we learned that the normality bias
swamped the omission bias. In order to gain a little more insight into
the strength and generality of the normality bias, we conducted a sec-
ond experiment that involved stock portfolios that had gone sour.
203 See supra Part I.A.
204 Sugarman, supra note 138, at 72.
205 See supra Part II.F.1.
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1. Details of the Case
As in the Medical Malpractice experiment, the Stock Loss experi-
ment examined the effects of (1) normal versus abnormal states, and
(2) active versus passive conduct, on mock jurors' judgments of liabil-
ity and compensation. The Stock Loss experiment also was designed
and conducted in a way that enabled us to separate the effects of the
normality and omission biases.
We presented ninety-two individual mock jurors with one of four
versions of the case that appears in Appendix B. 20 6 In this case, the
plaintiff inherited $1,000,000 in stocks and brought this portfolio to a
financial advisor. The inherited stocks were identified as either
"widely owned conventional stocks" (normal) or "less widely owned
unconventional stocks" (abnormal). The financial advisor either re-
placed the conventional/unconventional stocks with a set of uncon-
ventional/conventional stocks (active), or he simply retained the
original set of stocks (passive). In all cases, the value of the portfolio
dropped to $300,000 within a year, and the plaintiff sued the financial
advisor for negligence. The plaintiff sought $2,000,000 in damages. 207
As in the Medical Malpractice experiment, we asked jurors to
make judgments of liability and compensation. 20 8 In addition, we
asked jurors to indicate "how much responsibility" the defendant
bears for the plaintiffs financial losses.20 9 The purpose of this ques-
tion was to determine whether there is an association between per-
ceived responsibility and either the normality or omission variables.
Based on the results of the Medical Malpractice experiment, we
expected jurors to assign greater responsibility to the financial advisor
when the declining stock portfolio was comprised of unconventional
stocks, regardless of whether the advisor played an active or passive
role in creating the portfolio. Because questions related to negative
emotional reactions had no impact in the first experiment, we did not
include them here.
2. Results and Discussion
Data from the Stock Loss experiment showed that the active/pas-
sive variable played little, if any, role in jurors' verdicts or the size of
damages awards. Nearly identical proportions of individual jurors in
the active and passive harm groups judged the financial advisor's con-
206 Forty-seven percent of the mock jurors were female and ninety-four percent were
eligible for jury service. As in the previous experiment,jury eligibility was self-reported. See
Appendix B, Question 5.
207 The plaintiff sought damages for the full value of his original portfolio, emotional
distress, and a punitive award.
208 See infra Appendix B, Questions 1-2.
209 See infra Appendix B, Question 3.
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duct to be negligent (57% vs. 52% respectively, which is not statisti-
cally significant).. However, jurors were significantly more likely to
find the financial advisor negligent when the stocks were unconven-
tional than when the stocks were conventional in both the active (68%
vs. 45%) and the passive (57% vs. 48%) treatment conditions.210
Among those who gave damages awards, jurors tended to give higher
awards when the stocks were unconventional rather than conven-
tional, though this difference did not reach statistical significance (av-
erage awards were $1,152,407 vs. $947,368, respectively). 211
The data on the responsibility question (1 = no responsibility, 7 =
all responsibility) supported our prediction about the importance of
the abnormal/normal variable relative to the active/passive variable.
Jurors did not assign more responsibility to the financial advisor for
the stock loss when he was active rather than passive. However, jurors
did assign more responsibility to the advisor when the declining port-
folio contained unconventional rather than conventional stocks (4.7
vs. 3.7).212
FIGuRE 2













Type of Decision by Financial Advisor
210 p<.03
211 p =.101
212 p < .01
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In short, the results of the Stock Loss experiment are consistent
with those of the Medical Malpractice experiment. In both experi-
ments we obtained strong support for a normality bias with respect to
negligence and responsibility judgments, but no support for an omis-
sion bias. It appears thatjurors' perceptions of abnormality influence
their punishment decisions. When bad outcomes arise in association
with unusual circumstances, jurors are quicker to assign blame and
punishment. Jurors in both experiments cared little about whether
the bad outcome resulted from active or passive negligence.
IV
EXPLANATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The results of our experiments raise at least two important ques-
tions. First, why is the normality bias so powerful? Second, what are
the implications of these results?
A. Explanations
Why do people in general, and jurors in particular, react more
strongly to harms that have abnormal causes than those that have nor-
mal causes? One explanation is that people have a strong, natural
preference for preserving and reinforcing what they perceive to be
normal states of the world. We want patients to receive conventional
treatments and stockbrokers to place conventional stocks in our port-
folios. When trusted agents such as doctors, stockbrokers, or attor-
neys rely on a proven method, it is difficult to blame them for
subsequent bad outcomes. Their behaviors do not seem particularly
reckless or negligent. Indeed, it is tempting to commend them for
behaving in ways that preserve, rather than undermine, the social
order.
Conversely, when things go awry it is easier to blame agents who
follow unconventional methods. As discussed earlier, abnormal situa-
tions trigger counterfactual "if only" thoughts. 213 Agents who follow
unconventional paths may seem particularly negligent to the extent
that jurors and judges indulge the counterfactual thought that the
bad result could have been avoided if only the agent had made a dif-
ferent choice. Furthermore, unconventional agents may be viewed as
violating a social norm. If Emile Durkheim is right, then trusted
agents who make judgment errors may be punished once for their
misjudgment, and punished again if their misjudgment runs afoul of a
cherished norm.214 Accordingly, the degree of blame and punish-
213 See supra Part II.H.2.
214 See EMILE DURKHEIM, MORAL EDUCATION: A STUDY IN THE THEORY AND APPLICATION
OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION 167 (Paul Fauconnet ed. and Everett K Wilson & Her-
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
ment fact finders assign for misdeeds reflects the degree to which
those misdeeds threaten or harm the social order. 215
1. Social Proof
In our medical malpractice and stockbroker negligence experi-
ments, we introduced uncontroverted expert testimony that the de-
fendants did the wrong thing, and that this behavior led to a bad
outcome. The results showed that this testimony was not sufficient to
cause participants in the various groups to see the case in a similar
light. We found that labeling identical options as "conventional" for
one group and "unconventional" for another group was sufficient to
alter jurors' judgments of responsibility and liability for the bad out-
come. Jurors punished defendants who made conventional choices
less harshly.
Such treatment is consistent with the theory of social proof,
which holds that we base judgments of appropriate conduct, in part,
on the behaviors of those around us. 2 16 More generally, social proof
is a broad and compelling theory of human action and response to
action. 217 It helps account for the success of laugh tracks on TV
shows, 218 mass suicides,219 and the tendency of bystanders to fail to
man Schnurer trans., Free Press 1961) (1925) (noting that punishment serves both to cor-
rect immediate harms and, more generally, to prevent the erosion of the social order).
215 See generally Dale T. Miller & Neil Vidmar, The Social Psychology of Punishment Reac-
tions, in THE JUSTICE MOTIVE IN SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: ADAPTING TO TIMES OF SCARCITY AND
CHANGE 145 (MelvinJ. Lerner & Sally C. Lerner eds., 1981) (arguing that public attitudes
about punishment issues are driven more by symbolic concerns about values than by practi-
cal concerns about actual reduction of crime).
216 ROBERT R.CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 114 (3d ed. 1993).
217 See ROBERT AUNGER, THE ELECTRIC MEME: A NEW THEORY OF How WE THINK 47
(2002) (noting that there is strong evidence that cultural transmission is "an important
component of everyday learning"); CIALDINI, supra note 216, at 114-33 (explaining and
illustrating the social proof concept); Robert Axelrod, An Evolutionary Approach to Norms, 80
Am. Pol.. Sci. REV. 1095, 1105 (1986) ("The actions of others provide information about
what is proper for us, even if we do not know the reasons."); Robert H. Frank, The Political
Economy of Preference Falsfication: Timur Kuran's Private Truths, Public Lies, 34J. ECON. LIT.
115, 119 (1996) (noting that "our cognitive capabilities are limited, and without heavy
reliance on social proof no one could manage even to get through the day"); Harvey, supra
note 87, at 47 ("Socialization and habit are powerful forces in defining and determining
actions.").
218 John Mariotti, Understanding Influence and Persuasion, INDUSTRY WEEK, Apr. 5, 1999,
at 126.
219 Id. (noting that theJonestown mass suicide can be linked to; social proof). Empiri-
cal studies have also linked social proof to suicide. See, e.g., Ann F. Garland & Edward
Zigler, Adolescent Suicide Prevention: Current Research and Social Policy Implications, 48 AM. Psy-
CHOLOGIST 169, 174 (1993) (noting the existence of a social imitation effect that increases
the likelihood of suicide when others have modeled the behavior and thereby lowered the
taboo against suicide); David P. Phillips & Lundie L. Carstensen, The Effect of Suicide Stories
on Various Demographic Groups, 1968-1985, 18 SUICIDE & LIFE-THREATENING BEHAVIOR 100,
108 (1988) (finding that "nearly all demographic groups displayed a rise in suicides after
publicized suicide stories").
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help a person in peril when others seem unconcerned. 220 Moreover,
social proof has been shown to influence decisions to sign form con-
tracts,22 1 to return a lost wallet, 22 2 to donate to charity,223 to approach
a frightening dog,224 to litter,2 25 to vote for a particular candidate, 22 6
to buy particular books,227 and to engage in promiscuous sexual activ-
ity in a safe versus unsafe manner.228 Social proof also induces securi-
ties analysts to initiate and abandon coverage of certain firms. 229
Likewise, in our studies social proof appears to have worked in favor
220 See BIBB LATAN9 & JOHN M. DARLEY, THE UNRESPONSIVE BYSTANDER: WHY DOESN'T
HE HELP? 89-90 (1970) (discussing the effects of social proof with respect to the infamous
Kitty Genovese case, in which dozens of people witnessed or heard a series of attacks on a
young woman in New York City, yet no one intervened).
221 Shell, supra note 71, at 1370-71 ("To the extent customers think about [clauses in
form contracts] at all, my guess is that they say to themselves: 'There are a lot of people like
me . . . and they all signed this contract, too ..... It must be OR'").
222 Harvey A. Hornstein et al., Influence of a Model's Feeling About His Behavior and His
Relevance as a Comparison Other on Observers' Helping Behavior, 10 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 222, 225 (1968) (finding that people are more likely to return a lost wallet intact
when they have a model of someone similar to them doing so).
223 Peter H. Reingen, Test of a List Procedure for Inducing Compliance with a Request to
Donate Money, 67J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 110, 117 (1982) (finding that people are much more
likely to comply with a request to donate money or blood when they are first shown a list of
other compliers).
224 Albert Bandura et al., Vicarious Extinction of Avoidance Behavior, 5 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 16, 20 (1967) (reporting the results of a study that found that children's fear
of dogs was not reduced by seeing a dog in a positive light, but was reduced by seeing other
children interact nonanxiously with a dog).
225 Robert B. Cialdini et al., A Focus Theoy of Normative Conduct: Recycling the Concept of
Norms to Reduce Littering in Public Places, 58J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1015, 1024-25
(1990) (finding that people's beliefs about others' littering affected their own practices).
226 LARRY M. BARTELS, PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES AND THE DYNAMICS OF PUBLIC CHOICE
110-11 (1988) (finding that favorable poll results cause people to evaluate a candidate
more positively).
227 Authors have secretly purchased enough copies of their books from key bookstores
to put the book on the bestseller lists. Despite mediocre reviews, social proof then made
the books true best sellers. See David D. Kirkpatrick, Book Agent's Buying Fuels Concern on
Influencing Best-Seller Lists, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2000, at Cl.
228 Bram P. Buunk & Arnold B. Bakker, Extradyadic Sex: The Role of Descriptive and In-
junctive Norms, 32 J. SEX RES. 313, 317 (1995) (finding in two studies that the perceived
conduct of others had an important impact on whether individuals chose to engage in
extramarital sexual relations); Robert W. Winslow et al., Perceived Peer Norms, Casual Sex, and
AIDS Risk Prevention, 22J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 1809, 1821 (1992) (finding that college
students' perceptions of the behavior of their peers had more impact on their sexual activ-
ity than did knowledge about AIDS).
229 Hayagreeva Rao et al., Fool's Gold: Social Proof in the Initiation and Abandonment of
Coverage by Wall Street Analysts, 46 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 502, 521 (2001) (reporting the results of a
study showing that "research departments of investment banks and brokerage firms were
more likely to adopt a focal firm for coverage when peers had recently adopted it"). Simi-
larly, television networks take cues from each other in programming and introduce shows
aimed at taking advantage of the success of competitors even though conventional indus-
trial organization theory implies that firms should differentiate their products. See Sushil
Bikhchandani et al., Learning from the Behaviors of Others: Conformity, Fads, and Informational
Cascades, 12J. ECON. PERSP. 151, 164 (1998).
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of the defendants who provided conventional treatments, but against
those who provided unconventional treatments.
We contend that in judging defendants' conduct,jurors take cues
from evidence relevant to social proof. If they receive evidence that
the defendants' actions were usual, customary, traditional, or conven-
tional, then we expect that they will be less likely to find defendants'
conduct to be blameworthy or causal than if they receive evidence that
defendants' actions were unusual, nontraditional, or unconventional.
This is true even if the defendants' actions in the two scenarios exhibit
the same intent, effort, and level of consideration. 230
2. Need to Conform
Social proof may be rooted in what some evolutionary biologists
call a "need for conformity." 231 Although experts disagree as to the
roots of this need, 23 2 some believe that it harkens back to more primi-
tive times when food was scarce and conformist animals had a clear
advantage in the quest for survival. 233 For example, evolutionary bi-
ologists suggest that different populations of the same species use dif-
ferent sophisticated strategies to catch prey, depending on their
particular location.2 34 Regarding the adaptive nature of human con-
formity, Professor Lopreato notes that "[v]oluntary conformity grants
us a learning shortcut, quicker and more efficient than individual
trial-and-error behavior."23 5
2_3 Heidi Feldman points out that jurors are asked to engage in a thought experiment
in which they must compare the defendant's conduct to that of a fictional "reasonably
prudent person." Feldman, supra note 5, at 1447. Our point is that social proof exerts
substantial influence on jurors' perceptions of how a "reasonably prudent person" would
act.
231 JOSEPH LOPREATO, HUMAN NATURE & BIOCULTURAL EVOLUTION 177 (1984).
232 Edward Wilson, for example, traces it to a "neurologically based learning rule that
evolved through the selection of clans competing one against the other." EDWARD 0. WIL,
SON, ON HUMAN NATURE 184 (1978). Lopreato, on the other hand, believes that it is a
more fundamental mechanism associated with group life that predates organization into
clans. LOPREATO, supra note 231, at 177.
233 See, e.g., LOPREATO, supra note 231, at 177 (noting that "[w]here food is scarce,
pooled knowledge bestows upon the conformist an advantage over the nonconformist");
MA-I" RIDLEY, THE ORIGINS OF VIRTUE: HUMAN INSTINCTS AND THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERA-
TION 185 (1997) ("[1] n a small band of hunter-gatherers, it might have been a more useful
habit to obey the fashion.").
234 RIDLEY, sura note 233, at 181-82 (noting that "a killer whale from Norway would
starve off Patagonia unless it adopted the local habits"); see also Sushil Bikhchandani et al.,
A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades, 100 J. POL.
ECON. 992, 1010-11 (1992) (citing scientific evidence of imitative behavior transmission
among animals in territory choice, mating, and foraging).
235 LOPR-ATO, supra note 231, at 178; see also Bikhchandani et al., supra note 229, at 152
("The propensity to imitate is presumably an evolutionary adaptation that has promoted
survival over thousands of generations by allowing individuals to take advantage of the
hard-won information of others."); Harvey, supra note 87, at 61 ("We naturally desire to
emulate the behavior of our tribe. Because we gain an evolutionary advantage from our
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The message of our review of the psychology literature and exper-
iments is that jurors tend to blame defendants when they stray from




On a practical level, attorneys in negligence and other cases
could exploit our results. Plaintiffs' attorneys and prosecutors might
try to paint a defendant's actions as abnormal. Conversely, defend-
ants' attorneys might try to characterize their clients' acts as normal
for the existing circumstances. 23 6 Although ethicists recoil from "eve-
ryone does it" defenses,2 37 what everyone does has a great bearing on
what people perceive to be acceptable behavior.2 38
Indeed, the dominant rule at common law (the "per se" rule) was
that conformity to custom was a complete defense to a claim of breach
of the duty of care. 23 9 As one court concluded, "no jury can be per-
mitted to say that the usual and ordinary way, commonly adopted by
those in the same business, is a negligent way for which liability shall
be imposed." 240 This rule appears to have roots in notions of social
proof and the need to conform.
reliance on culture, we are biologically programmed to 'prefer' the ways of our elders and
peers.").
236 There may be substantial opportunity for such strategizing. As Kahneman and
Miller note, norms are not pre-existing constructs against which current events are com-
pared. Rather, they are constructed post hoc and therefore may be influenced by various
considerations. See Kahneman & Miller, supra note 51.
237 See Marianne M. Jennings, Moral Disengagement and Lawyers: Codes, Ethics, Conscience,
and Some Great Movies, 37 DuQ. L. REV. 573, 576 n.17 (1999) (decrying "everybody does it"
as a rationalization for all great scams and frauds).
238 Don Mayer argues:
The commonality of a phenomenon may, in short, provide some ethical
justification for it. As Donaldson and Dunfee note, "The claim that 'every-
one is doing it' is nowhere more common than in business ethics." This is
not necessarily because people in business have a lower ethical standard
than those in other walks of life, but because businesspeople exist in an
artifactual context where institutions are sometimes created by common
practice. The rules concerning proper disclosures and behaviors in negotia-
tions (e.g., revelations about the condition of real estate in a commercial
transaction), for example, often arise out of a history of common practice.
Although never a sufficient condition for ethical justification, the claim that
"everybody's doing something" can have some moral force in business
contexts.
Don Mayer, Community, Business Ethics, and Global Capitalism, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 215, 220
(2001) (quoting Thomas Donaldson & Thomas W. Dunfee, Toward a Unified Conception of
Business Ethics: Integrative Social Contracts Theoiy, 19 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 252, 259 (1994)).
239 See Steven Hetcher, Creating Safe Social Norms in a Dangerous World, 73 S. CAL. L. REV.
1, 10-19 (1999) (discussing the "per se" rule).
240 Titus v. Bradford, B. & K. R.R. Co., 20 A. 517, 518 (Pa. 1890); see also Webber v.
Bank of Tracy, 225 P. 41, 42-44 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1924) (exonerating defendant from
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By the early 1900s, two of the century's finest legal minds, Oliver
Wendell Holmes and Learned Hand, fashioned opinions that suc-
ceeded in substantially replacing the "per se" rule with the "eviden-
tiary" rule, which holds that conformity to custom is evidence that the
standard of due care was met, but is not conclusive. As Justice Holmes
wrote in Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Behymer, "What usually is done
may be evidence of what ought to be done, but what ought to be done
is fixed by a standard of reasonable prudence, whether it usually is
complied with or not."241 Judge Hand agreed in the famous T.J.
Hooper case: "Indeed in most cases reasonable prudence is in fact com-
mon prudence; but strictly it is never its measure; a whole calling may
have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available devices."2 42
Today, the "per se" rule persists as the standard of care for medi-
cal malpractice. 243 This is unfortunate, because physicians are as
likely to think heuristically, employ standards of social proof, and fall
victim to the same decisional biases as everyone else. 244 Consider, for
example, the tonsillectomy. For decades doctors performed tens of
thousands of these operations, causing substantial damage to many
negligence claim on grounds that its actions conformed to the practice of other country
banks in California, and holding "no jury can be permitted to say that the usual way and
ordinary way is a negligent way, for which liability shall be imposed").
241 189 U.S. 468, 470 (1903).
242 The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) (finding that conformity to cus-
tom was not necessarily due care and thatjuries should inquire as to whether the custom-
in this case the failure of tug boats to carry radio equipment to warn them of impending
storms-had lagged behind what was reasonably required).
243 See, e.g., Tant v. Women's Clinic, 382 So. 2d 1120, 1121-23 (Ala. 1980) (finding that
the trial judge properly granted summary judgment to the defendant physician based on
testimony that defendant's actions were consistent with the practice of physicians in the
community); Gray v. McDermott, 64 S.W.2d 94, 96 (Ark. 1933) (holding that a physician
need only meet the standard of other physicians "in good standing in this neighborhood").
244 For example, it is well documented that physicians' decisions are affected by the
self-serving bias: the tendency to do what is in one's own best interest. Many studies have
shown that physicians order more tests and longer treatments when they refer patients
(particularly well-insured patients) to facilities that they own than when they refer patients
to facilities owned by others. See, e.g., Thomas L. Carson, Conflicts of Interest, 13 J. Bus.
ETHIcs 387, 394 (1994) ("[W]hen physicians are paid according to how much work they do
for their patients, many physicians succumb to the temptation to provide their patients
with unnecessary, even dangerous treatments."); David Hemenway et al., Physicians' Re-
sponses to Financial Incentives, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1059, 1060 (1990) (reporting results of
study finding that when physicians' compensation changed from a flat fee to a bonus sys-
tem through which they could earn extra revenue by ordering laboratory tests for patients
on their employers' machines, physicians increased their orders for lab tests by 23%);
Bruce J. Hillman et al., Physicians' Utilization and Charges for Outpatient Diagnostic Imaging in
a Medicare Population, 268 JAMA 2050, 2052 (1992) (finding that physicians who performed
imaging examinations in their own offices were 1.7 to 7.7 times more likely to perform
imaging examinations than physicians who referred patients to other radiologists); Jean M.
Mitchell, Physician Ownership of Physical Therapy Services, 268 JAMA 2055, 2057-58 (1992)
(finding that visits per patient were 39% to 45% higher in facilities where referring physi-
cians were joint venturers, and that joint venture facilities generated more revenue from
patients with well-paying insurance).
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patients on the basis of little or no medical research. 245 Indeed, there
is evidence that the physicians' primary motivation for performing
these operations was simple social proof-they performed tonsillecto-
mies because other doctors in their geographic area performed tonsil-
lectomies. 246  The problem of surgery by social proof is well
documented and has led to surgical fads24 7 and "diseases of the
month."248
The results of our experiments suggest that much of the good
that was done by shifting from a per se rule to an evidentiary rule may
be undone by a normality bias. If a defendant's practice is unsafe but
nonetheless represents the common practice (as did the shipping
companies' failure to install radios on tugs in the T.J. Hooper case 249 ),
then jurors may be reluctant to scrutinize these seemingly normal ac-
tivities.250 This normality bias, in turn, might cause people to be re-
luctant to try new methods and procedures because straying from the
ordinary path would invite liability.2 5 '
245 See EUGENE D. ROBIN, MATTERS OF LIFE & DEATH: RISKS VS. BENEFITS OF MEDICAL
CARE 75 (1984) ("For many decades, tonsillectomy was performed in millions of children
on a more or less routine basis. In most cases, the operation was unnecessary."); RICHARD
TAYLOR: MEDICINE OUT OF CONTROL: THE ANATOMY OF A MALIGNANT TECHNOLOGY 159
(1979) (noting the lack of scientific evidence supporting the need for the operation).
246 There was wide geographical variation in the frequency of tonsillectomies because
doctors tended to follow the practice in their locality. See TAYLOR, supra note 245, at
158-59; see also Charles E. Phelps & Cathleen Mooney, Variations in Medical Practice Use:
Causes and Consequences, in COMPETITIVE APPROACHES TO HEALTH CARE REFORM 139, 140-41
(Richard J. Arnould et al. eds., 1993) (finding substantial cross-country variance in tonsil-
lectomies and other medical procedures).
247 Bikhchandani et al., supra note 229, at 167 (noting that "a blind reliance by physi-
cians upon what colleagues have done or are doing commonly leads to surgical fads and
even to treatment-caused illnesses").
248 See Bikhchandani et al., supra note 234, at 1010 (citing several studies showing that
physicians who are "not well informed about the cutting edge of research" may imitate
medical opinion in making treatment decisions); John F. Burnum, Medical Practice a la
Mode: How Medical Fashions Determine Medical Care, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1220, 1221-22
(1987) (referring to "bandwagon diseases" made popular by doctors who "like lemmings,
episodically and with a blind infectious enthusiasm [emphasize] certain diseases and treat-
ments primarily because everyone else is doing the same").
249 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
250 Along this line, we surmise that a medical expert who testifies "this is the treatment
that I, as an expert, would recommend" would not be as persuasive as an expert who testi-
fies "this is the treatment that I, as a medical expert, know that most physicians would
recommend." We have not tested this prediction.
251 In 1916, Professor Henry Miller noted that the per se rule retarded adoption of
safer practices:
The harmful results that would in all probability follow the adoption of the
common usage, and the safe results that would be assured by the substitu-
tion of a different method might, in a particular case, be so apparent that a
prudent man would reject the former, and adopt the latter course. But in
doing this he would depart from the rule laid down by the "unbending [per
se] test" and of his own accord adopt the wiser and safer rule. Yet the rule
of the "unbending [per se] test" constrains him to adopt the unsafe method
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2. Judges
Just as social proof, a need to conform, and a host of previously
discussed psychological mechanisms help produce a normality bias in
jurors' decisions, these same forces operate on judges to promote stare
decisis. A judge's decision to rely upon stare decisis is essentially volun-
tary. 252 Why do judges choose to follow precedents? Some academics
have offered a public choice theory, 253 but we find recent work that
associates stare decisis with information cascades25 4 and path depen-
dency 255 to be more persuasive. Surely there are many strong policy
reasons for adhering to stare decisis. For example, precedent creates
stability and predictability in the law. 256 The use of precedent also
gives the appearance that judges are deciding cases in a principled
fashion rather than on personal whim.257
Nevertheless, we assert that psychological factors also play a role,
and help account for the fact that bad law often stays on the books for
a long time.258 First, American judges adhere to stare decisis because it
is an inheritance from English tradition and therefore represents the
status quo. 259 Second, the use of precedent is an example of the omis-
in order to bring himself within the rule and escape the charge of
negligence.
Henry R. Miller, Jr., The So-Called Unbending Test of Negligence, 3 VA. L. REv. 537, 543 (1915);
see also Clarence Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1147, 1160 (1942) (not-
ing that "[s]ince customs may be venal, conformity to them may constitute outrageous
misconduct").
252 See Erin O'Hara, Social Constraint or Implicit Collusion?: Toward a Came Theoretic Analy-
sis of Stare Decisis, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 736, 737 (1993) (noting that (1) no law mandates
the use of precedent in most jurisdictions, (2) the general public generally has no way to
know whether judges are following precedent or not, and (3) even federal judges with
lifetime tenure tend to follow precedent). Without question, the use of merely persuasive
precedent is voluntary, and judges often rely on such precedents. MELVIN ARON EISEN-
BERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAw 96-99 (1988).
253 See, e.g., O'Hara, supra note 252, at 748-53 (using game theory to argue that judges
invoke precedent because it ultimately maximizes the influence of their own decisions).
254 See Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Stampede to Judgment: Persuasive
Influence and Herding Behavior by Courts, 1 AM. L. ECON. REV. 158 (1999). But see Eric Talley,
Precedential Cascades: An Appraisal, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 87 (1999) (critiquing the precedential
cascade theory).
255 See Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal
Change in a Common Law System, 86 IowA L. REv. 601 (2001).
256 See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970).
257 See Deborah Hellman, The Importance of Appearing Principled, 37 ARIz. L. REV. 1108,
1111 (1995) (noting that stare decisis plays this role, though judges seldom mention it in
their opinions).
258 As Holmes has observed, "precedents survive in the law long after the use they once
served is at an end and the reason for them has been forgotten." O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE
COMMON LAw 35 (1881).
259 See Hathaway, supra note 255, at 627 ("Perhaps most important, judges conform to
the doctrine of stare decisis because the principle of precedent is deeply ingrained in our
Anglo-American legal culture."); Hoffman & O'Shea, supra note 5, at 392 (suggesting a
link between the status quo bias and the role of precedent in our legal system); Harry W.
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sion bias. Judges will often accept the current state, which is repre-
sented by precedent, because to do otherwise would require
significant cognitive effort. 260 Third, stare decisis illustrates an applica-
tion of social proof. This is especially evident in judges' emphasis on
finding the majority view when searching through precedents. Of
course, the majority view might be the majority view because the argu-
ments offered in its support are stronger. However, perceptions of
argument strength are themselves influenced by whether or not the
arguments represent a majority view.26 1 Such a biased evaluation of
argument strength is so pervasive that disinterested scientists who
were asked to evaluate the strength of scientific evidence succumbed
to the bias.2 62
3. Conservatism in the Legal System
All of the phenomena that we have examined support one funda-
mental idea: people do not like that which is abnormal. The status
quo bias (keep the present state), the endowment effect (preference
for currently owned items), loss aversion (resistance to gambling with
the present state), anchoring (overemphasis on current conditions),
sunk cost effects (keep existing commitments), and the omission bias
(unfavorable view of change-producing actions) all favor present
states. 263 The normality bias, which focuses on what is usual, typical,
and expected, captures this theme.264 In light of the psychological
Jones, Precedent and Policy in Constitutional Law, 4 PACE L. REV. 11, 16-17 (1983) (describing
the historical roots of stare decisis and its continuing importance today).
260 See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921) (not-
ing that "the labor ofjudges would be increased almost to the breaking point if every past
decision could be reopened in every case, and one could not only lay one's own course of
bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid by others who had gone before him");
Hathaway, supra note 255, at 626 ("By relying on past decisions, judges can save significant
time and effort and thereby consider far more cases than would otherwise be possible.
Judges can turn to past analyses and avoid rethinking every aspect of a decision.").
There is substantial evidence that people are vigilant about the mental effort required
for them to process information and are sensitive to that effort. See, e.g.,John T. Cacioppo
et al., Effects of Need for Cognition on Message Evaluation, Recall, and Persuasion, 45J. PERSONAL.
ITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 805, 816 (1983) (reporting that "individuals high in need for cogni-
tion" paid more attention to persuasive arguments when forming opinions about an issue
than those who did not have a high need for cognition); Kevin Lane Keller & Richard
Staelin, Effects of Quality and Quantity of Information on Decision Effectiveness, 14J. CONSUMER
RES. 200, 212 (1987) (finding that too much information, even high-quality information,
causes information overload and a decrease in decision effectiveness).
261 See supra notes 258-59 and accompanying text.
262 SeeJonathan J. Koehler, The Influence of Prior Beliefs on Scientific Judgments of Evidence
Quality, 56 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 28, 47 (1993) (finding
that scientists judged evidence that was consistent with their experimentally manipulated
beliefs to be stronger than identical evidence that was inconsistent with their manipulated
beliefs).
263 See supra Parts IA, II.A-E.
264 See supra Part I.B.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
mechanisms that we have described-attribution theory, counterfac-
tual thinking, and regret theory265-people's aversion to what is unu-
sual should not be surprising. We are creatures who invoke simplistic
mental schemas to discover cause-effect relations. We indulge in re-
gret-inducing "if only" thoughts in the clear light of hindsight. We
believe the bad outcomes that we occasionally encounter can be un-
derstood as the inevitable result of the foolish or evil acts of those who
fail to heed the wisdom and safety of the norm.
Accordingly, jurors often decide that engaging in usual or typical
behavior constitutes due care (and engaging in unusual behavior does
not) ,266 and judges adhere to majority precedents, even if they have
outlived their usefulness. 26 7 This is consistent with the conservative
nature of human beings that we highlighted earlier,2 38 but which may
not be optimal. Normal behavior may be efficient. For example, con-
sider the social norm2 69 of standing in line rather than having a battle
when many people simultaneously wish to buy a movie ticket. Never-
theless, normal behavior can also be "arbitrary and fatuous" as in most
fashion conventions;2711 inefficient and dangerous as in The T.J Hooper
case, in which most tug boats did not carry radios;271 and inefficient
265 See supra Part II.F-H.
266 See supra Part IV.B.
267 See supra Part IV.B.2.
268 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
269 Although we are using the term "norm" primarily to denote average or conven-
tional behavior, there is legal literature on "social norms" and their impact on society and
the legal system. In this literature, a social norm generally refers to "an obligation backed
by a social sanction." Robert D. Cooter, Three Effects of Social Norms on Law: Expression,
Deterrence, and Internalization, 79 OR. L. REV. 1, 5 (2000). A perusal of the social norm
literature adds at least indirect insights into the workings of the normality bias. See generally
Robert C. Ellickson, The Evolution of Social Norms: A Perspective from the Legal Academy, in
SOCIAL NORMS 35 (Michael Hechter & Karl-Dieter Opp eds., 2001) (surveying the social
norm literature); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96
MICH. L. REv. 338 (1997) (same); Wendel, supra note 2 (critiquing the social norm
literature).
270 Lynn Stout labels the conventions that adult males should wear ties and grass
should be mowed "arbitrary and fatuous." Lynn A. Stout, Other-Regarding Preferences and
Social Norms, SSRN 25 (Mar. 25, 2001), at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stractid.=265902.
271 60 F.2d 737, 737 (2d Cir. 1932). Dueling is another inefficient and dangerous
norm which, fortunately, has also passed from the scene.
Robert Cooter advises that judges should not simply accept industry norms, but rather
should examine efficiency using standard economic tools. Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized
Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144
U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1655-56 (1996). Even Judge Posner admits that industry standards
will not necessarily be efficient when no market relationship exists between the industry
and its potential negligence victims (although he thinks, optimistically in our view, such
standards will be efficient if there is such a relationship). See Rodi Yachts, Inc. v. Nat'l
Marine, Inc., 984 F.2d 880, 888-89 (7th Cir. 1993).
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and evil as in the caste system in India and segregation in the Ameri-
can South's recent past.2 72
4. Psychological Foundations
Earlier we suggested that a behavioral analysis of the law may pro-
vide more insights into the law from this point forward than a stan-
dard economic analysis. In this Article, we have already suggested that
the normality and status quo biases help account for stare decisis,273
that the omission bias underlies the hesitancy to impose a duty to res-
cue, 274 that both the omission and normality biases contribute to the
law of proximate causation, 275 and that the normality bias helped cre-
ate the "per se" and "evidentiary" approaches to determining the stan-
dard of due care. 2 76
In addition, legal scholars and psychology scholars have identi-
fied other behavioral biases that are important for the rule of law. For
example, an awareness of the hindsight bias2 77 may underlie the exis-
tence of the business judgment rule 278 and the "secondary considera-
tions" requirement in the test for nonobviousness in patent law.
2 79
Recognition of the anchoring effect of ad damnum clauses provides
the rationale for the recent trend away from their use.280 The endow-
272 Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 587 (1998).
273 See supra Part IV.B.2.
274 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
275 See supra Part II.G.
276 See supra Part 1V.B.1.
277 Baruch Fischhoff is one of the first to have studied the hindsight bias, which he
describes as follows:
In hindsight, people consistently exaggerate what could have been antici-
pated in foresight. They not only tend to view what has happened as having
been inevitable but also to view it as having appeared "relatively inevitable"
before it happened. People believe that others should have been able to
anticipate events much better than was actually the case.
Baruch Fischhoff, For Those Condemned to Study the Past: Heuristics and Biases in Hindsight, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 4, at 335, 341. The hindsight bias has been
detected in many contexts. See, e.g., John C. Anderson et al., Evaluation of Auditor Decisions:
Hindsight Bias Effects and the Expectation Gap, 14 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 711 (1993) (judges re-
viewing auditors' decisions); Hal R. Arkes et al., Hindsight Bias Among Physicians Weighing the
Likelihood of Diagnoses, 66J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 252 (1981) (medical diagnoses); Jonathan D.
Casper et al., Juror Decision Making, Attitudes, and the Hindsight Bias, 13 LAw & HuM. BEHAV.
291 (1989) (jury decisions); Susan J. LaBine & Gary LaBine, Determinations of Negligence and
the Hindsight Bias, 20 LAW & HuM. BEHAv. 501 (1996) (study subjects reviewing psychother-
apists' diagnoses); Nicolaos E. Synodinos, Hindsight Distortion: "I Knew-It-All-Along and I Was
Sure About It", 16J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 107, 109-14 (1986) (elections).
278 See Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A. Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. the Business Judgment
Rule: Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REv. 587 (1994). But seeJeffreyJ. Rachlinski, A
Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 571, 619-23 (1998)
(finding an economic account for the business judgment rule more convincing).
279 Rachlinski, supra note 278, at 613-15.
280 Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive Damages
Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 Am. U. L. REv. 1269, 1278 n.62 (1993) (noting that
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ment effect may well be reflected in the common law of remedies.23'
Many laws that are impossible to justify on efficiency grounds may re-
main on the books because fairness concerns are an important (albeit
economically irrelevant) part of human decision making. 28 2 In short,
behavioral analyses of legal phenomena provide a perspective that
cannot be gleaned from economic analyses. This is not to say that
psychology should replace economics as the framework for investigat-
ing and applying legal doctrine. However, we agree with Sunstein
when he suggests that behavioral analysis can help us to understand
why the law is as it is.283
C. Remaining Questions
Although this Article has explored a large number of decision
bias studies and contributed two studies on the normality bias in a
legal context, important questions remain relatively unstudied. We
sketch three such questions below.
First, how do people decide what is "normal"? In our Medical
Malpractice and Stock Loss experiments, we attempted to cue normal-
ity by the word "conventional" and abnormality by the label "uncon-
ventional." 284 Based on their responses to a direct question about the
abnormality of treatment, 28 5 we verified that the mock jurors associ-
ated "unconventional" treatments with "abnormal" ones. 28 6 But when
linguistic cues are absent, the basis on which decision makers deter-
mine that a practice or behavior is normal is not obvious.
A second question concerns the relationship between normality
and harm. Ordinarily, behavior that accords with societal norms car-
ries less risk than the behavioral alternatives. But what if normal be-
haviors are known to be more harmful than the various alternatives?
For example, what if a cigarette manufacturer prints a standard warn-
ing on its products (e.g., "smoking may be hazardous to your health"),
even after it knows that this warning is less effective than a stronger
warning (e.g., "smoking may cause death")? Will the normality of the
behavior protect the manufacturer from severe consequences?
the policy underlying elimination of ad damnum clauses is "to avoid juries' premature eval-
uation of punitive damage claims").
281 SeeJeffreyJ. Rachlinski & Forestiourden, Remedies and the Psychology of Ownership, 51
VAND. L. Rhv. 1541, 1574-76 (1998) (exploring the relationship between the endowment
effect and the common law's presumption against equitable relief).
282 See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. Rv.
1471, 1509 (1998).
283 BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 6, at 1.
284 In the Stock Loss experiment, we also cued our subjects to the normality or abnor-
mality of the stock portfolios with the phrases "widely held" and "less widely held."
285 See infra Appendix A, Question 14.
286 See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
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The third question concerns'the strategic value of a normality
bias for decision makers who engage in actions that have the potential
to turn out very badly. Will individuals who know that fact finders are
especially likely to blame actors who follow unconventional paths be
less likely to stray from conventional paths? Similarly, will hospitals be
slow to offer alternative treatments for hard-to-treat diseases even after
evidence of their efficacy appears?
CONCLUSION
Numerous aspects of American law have been viewed through an
economics lens in recent years. The law-and-economics movement
undoubtedly deserves credit for increasing the rigor of legal scholar-
ship and for stimulating debate at the highest levels. Nevertheless, the
value of a normatively compelling economic theory for understanding
actual legal decisions should not be overestimated.
Most judges and jurors do not think like economists. Rather,
they are heuristic thinkers whose thought processes, judgments, and
choices are guided by a raft of psychological influences that defy tradi-
tional economic assumptions about how people make decisions. For
this reason, we assert that a psychological perspective-one that is
grounded in methodologically rigorous empirical studies that investi-
gate how people actually think and decide-will ultimately prove
more valuable as we attempt to understand the forces behind legal
judgments.
A behavioral movement is now underway in American jurispru-
dence, as many legal scholars study the behavioral science literature to
gain insight into the conduct of legal actors. Our empirically based
contribution to this enterprise is the suggestion that a normality
bias-a tendency for people to react more strongly to bad outcomes
that spring from abnormal circumstances than to otherwise identical
outcomes that spring from more ordinary circumstances-permeates
the legal landscape. In fact, the normality bias is so strong that it
swamps the influence of another well-documented bias-the omission
bias-when the two biases push in different directions. 287
287 Our results are consistent with an interesting study published after we completed
our experiments. Zeelenberg and colleagues recently surmised that because actions are
often taken in response to a prior negative outcome, in such settings a failure to act might
be regretted more than an action because "when prior outcomes are negative, people may
feel inclined to take action to improve future outcomes, which may make action more
normal than inaction." Marcel Zeelenberg et al., The Inaction Effect in the Psychology of Regret,
82J. PERSONAL[TY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 314, 314 (2002) (emphasis added). The authors' results
confirmed the notion that people regret bad consequences stemming from their actions
more than bad consequences stemming from their inactions when action seems more ab-
normal than inaction. Id. at 317. But in settings in which action seems to be the normal
response (for example, a consumer has had a bad experience with a brand name product
and would normally switch to another brand), then bad results stemming from such action
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Our specific findings suggest that if two doctors with similar train-
ing, experience, intention, and care chose a course of treatment for a
patient and the patient received bad results, the doctor who chose an
unconventional treatment will be judged more harshly than the doc-
tor who chose a conventional treatment. Our findings also suggest
that if two stockbrokers used similar levels of care to choose two differ-
ent portfolios for their customers, the stockbroker who chose the
more atypical portfolio is likely to be judged more severely by a jury if
both portfolios suffer heavy losses.
As these results imply, the force of the normality bias may be most
apparent in the courtroom. There is no logical reason why a mugger
should be punished more when his victim takes an unusual route
home than when the victim takes a usual route home, yet our findings
suggest that he will be punished more harshly. Likewise, a jury should
not give deference to the normal procedures of an entire industry that
has fallen behind in safety issues. Finally, physicians who perform op-
erations and prescribe treatments merely because most other physi-
cians in their geographic area do so should not be afforded legal
protection and jury deference, yet our findings suggest that they do
enjoy these benefits.
In general, a preference for that which is normal may translate
into large penalties for unlucky or negligent mavericks and innova-
tors, 288 and smaller penalties (or even exoneration) for equally un-
lucky or negligent rule-followers. To the extent this occurs, our legal
system may discourage innovative thinking and risk taking while giv-
ing undue deference to common practices, existing laws, and histori-
cal rulings.
(the consumer switches brands and has another bad experience) will be regretted less than
bad results stemming from inaction (the consumer stays with the initial product and has a
second bad experience). Id. at 324. As in our studies, the normal/abnormal distinction
was more influential than the action/inaction distinction.
288 Consider, for example, the introduction of new products. We suspect that a jury
would find more causation, attribute more responsibility, and assess higher damages when
injtries occur in relation to a defect in a new, innovative product than in relation to a
familiar product. We would expect to find this result, for example, if a television short-
circuited and started a house fire. We believe ajury would be harder on a defendant if the
television sported abnormal features, such as a built-in Internet capability.
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APPENDIX A
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE
VERSION: ABNORMAL + ACTIVE
Dr. Theodore Walker is an experienced physician who specializes in
the treatment of colon cancer. He works out of a top cancer clinic in
Houston.
Susan Abernathy (age 47) became one of Dr. Walker's patients in De-
cember 2000. Until recently, Ms. Abernathy had been treated accord-
ing to the conventional colon cancer protocol (Alpha). Most colon
cancer patients in this, and other, clinics are treated with the conven-
tional protocol Alpha.
Clinic policy mandates that each patient undergo a series of tests every
4 months to help the treating physician determine whether the treat-
ment protocol should be altered. On July 1, 2001, Dr. Walker re-
viewed the latest test results for Ms. Abernathy. Dr. Walker concluded
that Ms. Abernathy would be best served by immediately switching her
treatment from the conventional treatment protocol Alpha to the unconven-
tional treatment protocol Beta.
Unfortunately, Ms. Abernathy's immune system rejected the new (un-
conventional) treatment. She died three months after Dr. Walker
switched her away from the conventional treatment protocol Alpha.
Ms. Abernathy's family (the plaintiff) sued Dr. Walker for malpractice
and claimed that Ms. Abernathy died as a result of Dr. Walker's
incompetence.
At trial, three credible experts for the plaintiff testified that the test
results of July 1, 2001 did not support Dr. Walker's conclusion about
what would be the best treatment protocol for Ms. Abernathy. All
three experts also testified that Ms. Abernathy probably would have
had a normal, cancer free life if Dr. Walker had continued to treat Ms.
Abernathy with the conventional treatment protocol Alpha.
The defense did not present an expert, though it argued that none of
the experts could be "certain" what outcome would have occurred if
Ms. Abernathy continued to be treated with protocol Alpha.
Juror Instructions
Suppose you are a juror in this civil case. As such, you must decide
whether, by a preponderance of evidence, Dr. Walker was negligent in
his treatment of Ms. Abernathy.
A finding of negligence may not be based solely on evidence of a bad
result to Ms. Abernathy. However, a bad result may be considered by
you, along with other evidence, in determining the issue of negli-
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gence. You are the sole judges of the weight, if any, to be given to any
such evidence.
1. Would you find Dr. Walker negligent in his treatment of Ms.
Abernathy?
No Yes
2. What sum of money (if any) would you award in damages to the
plaintiffs?
For questions 3-5, please indicate your degree of disagreement or
agreement with each of the statements:
3. Dr. Walker caused the death of Ms. Abernathy.
I I I I I I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Neutral Strongly
Disagree Agree
4. Dr. Walker deserves substantial blame for the death of Ms.
Abernathy.
I I I I I I I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Neutral Strongly
Disagree Agree
5. Dr. Walker bears a heavy moral responsibility for the death of Ms.
Abernathy.
I I I I I I I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Neutral Strongly
Disagree Agree
Questions 6-12 are concerned with the feelings you would have if the
patient who died were a member of your family. Please indicate your
degree of disagreement or agreement with each statement below:
If the patient in this case were a member of my family:
6. I would feel betrayed.
I I I I I I I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Neutral Strongly
Disagree Agree
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7. I would feel angry.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Neutral Strongly
Disagree Agree
8. I would feel resentful.
I - I - I - I - I I - I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Neutral Strongly
Disagree Agree
9. I would feel anxious.
I - I - I - I - I - I - I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Neutral Strongly
Disagree Agree
10. I would feel scared.
I - I - I - I - I - I - I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Neutral Strongly
Disagree Agree
11. I would feel sad.
I I - I I - II - I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Neutral Strongly
Disagree Agree
12. I would feel disgusted.
I - I - I - I - I - I - I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Neutral Strongly
Disagree Agree
Finally, suppose that the State Medical Society has the power to
suspend the license of physicians who have engaged in negligent
conduct for up to one year. Please indicate your degree of
disagreement or agreement with this statement:
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13. I believe that the State Medical Society should impose the
maximum (one year) license suspension against Dr. Walker.
I I I - I I I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Neutral Strongly
Disagree Agree
14. Dr. Walker's treatment decision after he reviewed the July 2001
test results was abnormal.
I I I I I I I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Neutral Strongly
Disagree Agree
15. Gender (Please circle.)
Female Male
16. Are you eligible to serve on a jury in the United States? Circle
"No" if you (a) are not a U.S. citizen, (b) are less than 18 years old, or
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APPENDIX B
STOCK Loss CASE
VERSION: ABNORMAL + ACTIVE
Mr. Ronald Lawler inherited approximately $1,000,000 in stocks. Be-
cause he was unfamiliar with financial matters, Mr. Lawler brought
the stock certificates to an experienced financial advisor in Houston
named Jeffrey Braden.
Mr. Lawler's inheritance consisted entirely of a mix of the most widely
owned, conventional stocks from various sectors. Mr. Lawler gave Mr.
Braden permission to make reasonable transactions that served the
interest of his portfolio.
Shortly thereafter, Mr. Braden sold all of Mr. Lawler's widely owned, con-
ventional stocks in order to create a portfolio that consisted entirely of less
widely owned, unconventional stocks. Unfortunately, the value of Mr.
Lawler's new stock portfolio fell dramatically. Within a year, Mr.
Lawler's inheritance was worth only $300,000. Mr. Lawler sued Mr.
Braden for $2,000,000 for negligently handling his investment portfo-
lio. Specifically, Mr. Lawler sought to recover (a) the full value of his
original portfolio ($1,000,000), (b) $500,000 for the emotional dis-
tress associated with losing so much money, and (c) $500,000 in puni-
tive damages against Mr. Braden for violating the professional trust
that Mr. Lawler placed in him.
At trial, an expert for Mr. Lawler testified that stock market conditions
did not support Mr. Braden's decision to sell off Mr. Lawler's shares of
the conventional stocks in order to invest in unconventional stocks.
The expert also testified that if Mr. Braden had decided to stick with
the original portfolio of widely held stocks, Mr. Lawler's portfolio
would be worth approximately $1,100,000.
The defense did not present an expert, though it argued that at the
time Mr. Braden made his decision, no expert could have been "cer-
tain" about how different portfolios would perform in the future.
Juror Instructions
Suppose you are a juror in this civil case. As such, you must decide
whether, by a preponderance of evidence, Mr. Braden was negligent
in his treatment of Mr. Lawler's inheritance.
A finding of negligence may not be based solely on evidence of an
unfavorable financial result. However, an unfavorable financial result
may be considered by you, along with other evidence, in determining
the issue of negligence. You are the sole judges of the weight, if any,
to be given to any such evidence.
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1. Would you find Mr. Braden negligent in his treatment of Mr.
Lawler's inheritance?
No Yes
2. What sum of money (if any and in total) would you award in dam-
ages to Mr. Lawler for (a) financial losses, (b) emotional distress, and
(c) punitive damages against Mr. Braden? (Please provide a single dollar
amount.)
3. How much responsibility would you say that Mr. Braden bears for
Mr. Lawler's financial losses? (Please circle.)
I I I I i I I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
No All
Responsibility Respondibility
4. Gender (Please circle.)
Female Male
5. Are you eligible to serve on a jury in the United States? Circle
"No" if you (a) are not a U.S. citizen, (b) are less than 18 years old, or
(c) have been convicted of a felony. Otherwise circle 'Yes."
No Yes
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